Mary Shelley's Frankenstein as a Defense of the Ethics of Care by Ens, Devin
  
 
 
 
MARY SHELLEY'S FRANKENSTEIN  
AS A DEFENSE OF THE ETHICS OF CARE 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
In the Department of English 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
 
Devin Ens 
 
 
 
 
 
 Copyright Devin Ens, 2014. All rights reserved
 i 
Permission To Use. 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from the 
University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available 
for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in 
part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis 
work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis 
work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may 
be made of any material in my thesis.
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
 Feminist analyses of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein have yielded fruitful interpretations that make 
sense of what might otherwise be considered inessential details in the narrative. Specifically, the 
anxieties and politics of birth and motherhood have been brought forward as central concerns of the 
novel. However, given the influence of the liberal, Marxist, and radical strains of feminism in the 
period that laid the foundations of feminist Frankenstein scholarship (the 1960s-80s), most of this work 
has focused on the burdens of motherhood, the bonds of womanhood, or the oppressive structure of the 
family, in some cases accusing Shelley of offering a defense of patriarchy. 
 These influential strains of feminism were themselves influenced by the most dominant theories 
in philosophical ethics, deontology and utilitarianism, both of which emerged from the same 
Enlightenment intelligentsia that included Shelley's parents, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin. 
However, in the 1980s, a line of feminist inquiry began to yield an alternative to influential moral 
theories: the ethics of care. In contrast to the dominant theories, which tend to laud principle- or 
calculus-based ethical reasoning that assumes interchangeability of moral subjects, the ethics of care 
emphasises particular relationships and the fact that people are not interchangeable, having different 
vulnerabilities, dependencies, and dependents. Most importantly, care ethics accuses traditional ethics 
of ignoring children altogether, creating the illusion that the paradigmatic moral subject is neither 
dependent nor obligated in non-voluntary relationships. 
 The ethics of care presents challenges for some strains of feminism, particularly in that it takes 
as given certain natural differences between all people in terms of abilities and circumstances rather 
than seek to eliminate such differences, and that it argues in favour of the same self-sacrificing values 
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that many feminists have argued have contributed to women's oppression. Because of this dissent, I 
have decided to approach Frankenstein from the ethics of care, reading it as a criticism of the 
masculinist values and assumptions embedded in the emerging moral theories of Shelley's period. I will 
argue that Victor is emblematic of the detached individualistic ethical reasoner valued by masculinist 
theories and criticised by care ethicists. The Frankenstein family and the DeLaceys both provide 
examples of caring relations as contrasts to Victor's behaviour. The Creature, offspring of an incomplete 
moral theory, is both victim and perpetuator of masculinist individualistic, calculus-based moral 
reasoning. He is more aware than Victor of the necessity of caring relations, but he follows an ethic of 
retribution inspired by principle-based theories. He knows he needs a partner, but speaks of her in the 
language that Victor speaks of him—as property. The glimmer of hope in the novel lies with Walton, 
who, unlike Victor, is willing to engage in dialogue across difference, and finally to set his high 
aspirations aside for the well-being of his crew. 
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PERMISSION TO USE ....................................................................................................... i 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iv 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE: Kantianism, Utilitarianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: an unhappy family      
 ............................................................................................................................................. 3 
CHAPTER TWO: Swiss Family Frankenstein: a model of temperate, thoughtful, caring relations
 ........................................................................................................................................... 23 
CHAPTER THREE: A Case of Entitlement: how the logic of rights hastens Victor’s Tragedy      
 ........................................................................................................................................... 45 
CONCLUSION: “My Dear Sister”: reading from the standpoint of M.S.W.  .................. 64 
WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................... 66 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 While feminist readings of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818, 1831) have become common 
since the 1970s, the approach has usually concerned women’s political issues, with occasional reference 
to particular philosophers. This is understandable: nineteenth-century literature is famous for its social 
criticism, and it is natural to read works as commentaries on concrete aspects of society. I intend to 
approach Frankenstein, however, as offering a critique of a set of unstated masculinist assumptions 
underlying the two emerging philosophical schools of ethical thought that would end up dominating 
philosophical ethics, and by extension, law, until the present day. Shelley’s characterisations of Victor 
and his creature highlight many of the attitudes typifying the reasoning of both Kantian deontology and 
utilitarianism, as well as their political companion, liberalism. 
A more recent response to the masculinist assumptions underlying these mainstream ethical and 
political theories has been articulated in the ethics of care. Its proponents, such as Virginia Held, argue 
that the mainstream discussion of rights in the West assumes able-bodied autonomous individuals with 
no dependents or dependencies as the normal, natural, and neutral member of society. As a result, it not 
only runs into difficulties around the rights of spouses and children, it promulgates harmful fictions 
about personhood, autonomy, and responsibility. 
 Of particular interest to the Frankenstein scholar is the emphasis that the ethics of care places on 
motherhood. For care ethics, children do not present a difficult exception, they present the paradigm of 
moral responsibility. Whereas liberal ethics (Kantianism and utilitarianism) and the feminist ethics they 
have influenced hold that unequal power presents a problem for ethical interaction (because the 
paradigm interaction is taken to be a free interchange between independent individuals), the ethics of 
care argues that dependency and vulnerability are universal (everyone begins as a baby and many end 
 
 
2 
 
their lives in care) and the impetus to moral reasoning. The mother-child relationship is not an 
exception to moral life, but paradigmatic of it. 
 Recognising the primacy of motherhood in morality, the care ethicists have been critical of the 
detached, universalised approach of mainstream, masculinist ethics. While allowing for the possible 
compatibility of justice and care, they have also accused the justice-oriented tradition of erasing 
childhood from the discussion, much as the work of mothering is taken for granted socially. For this 
reason, Frankenstein presents an excellent critique of masculinist ethics: motivated by a desire to 
benefit “humanity” in general, Victor Frankenstein reneges on his particular duties, spurning his family 
and the opportunity to create life the traditional way so he can create instead the “perfect” being. It is 
telling that the perfect creature has no mother and begins life fully grown. 
The following discussion will argue that while Frankenstein is wide in its philosophical scope, 
one of its most vital concerns is the masculinist underpinnings of the ethics that emerged from the 
Enlightenment. Though it may be tempting to read Shelley’s critique as a Burkean conservative 
backlash,1 the implicit moral argument of the novel is feminist in tone, and most resonant with the 
ethics of care. Chapter One will explain the ethics of care and consider the most influential feminist 
readings of Frankenstein thus far. Chapters Two and Three will unpack Shelley’s critique of liberal 
ethics and implicit argument for the ethics of care. I will conclude that the novel's final appeal, reflected 
in the 1831 revisions, is to the values of care—it is a warning against the idealisation of a particular 
understanding of autonomy, duty, and the body.
                                                 
1 Anne Mellor in Mary Shelley, Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (1988), for example, suggests that Shelley's 1831 
revisions signify a conservative turn and that her ideology of the family is essentially bourgeois and partriarchal. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Kantianism, Utilitarianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: an unhappy family 
 
 As it is my contention that Frankenstein can be fruitfully interpreted as a critique of masculinist 
ethics from the perspective of the ethics of care, this chapter is devoted to explaining care ethics, its 
development as a school of philosophical thought, its tensions with liberalism, utilitarianism, and 
Kantian deontology, and its relationship with other areas of feminism. After contrasting the ethics of 
care with mainstream, allegedly masculinist, ethical theories, I will briefly survey some readings of the 
novel that draw on feminism or that put Shelley in conversation with philosophers who came before her 
that share similar concerns to the ethics of care. I hope to show that despite Shelley's implied views on 
family, close relationships, and moral sentiment resembling the conservative domestic ideology of her 
time, and although some of the important feminist elements of the novel have been identified by critics 
influenced by various traditions of feminism, the apparent contradiction between the conservative and 
feminist elements of Frankenstein are reconcilable when considered in light of the ethics of care. 
 The ethics of care has been a hotly debated approach to ethics both because many of its 
assumptions undermine those of mainstream political theories, including liberal feminism, but also 
because some critics claim that its values are already implicit in or derivable from other ethical 
traditions. Liberalism and liberal feminism tend to value detached reason, reciprocity, and equality. By 
contrast, care ethicists grant a strong cognitive and metaethical role to emotions in moral reasoning, 
assume that full reciprocity is not possible in normal (rather than exceptional) situations, and that 
certain kinds of inequality are not only a fact of life, but are the reason that moral deliberation is 
necessary. Because it embraces rather than rejects motherhood as a worthwhile activity, the ethics of 
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care must disagree with those radical feminist positions, such as Shulamith Firestone's, that tie the 
emancipation of women to a rejection of the values traditionally associated with maternity and 
caregiving.2 In contrast to these strains, the ethics of care takes the mother-child relationship as the 
paradigm of ethical interaction and argues that ethical reasoning has to assume interdependency and 
inequality. It shares with all feminisms the demand for political equality and an end to male dominance, 
but it rejects many of the ethical and metaphysical assumptions of both liberal and radical feminism. 
This includes the assumptions about individualism and the value of independence that liberal feminists 
such as Susan Moller Okin and Martha Nussbaum espouse; it also includes the hostility to heterosexual 
relationships in a sexist culture exemplified by radical feminists, such as Catherine MacKinnon or 
lesbian separatists like Charlotte Bunch.3 
 Since the Enlightenment, what can be generalised as “liberal morality” has dominated the 
political and philosophical spheres of the western world. Popularly, this is a combination the familiar 
“live and let live” attitude (influenced by utilitarianism along with a Kantian optimism about the ability 
of reason to regulate actions) and a sense of the sanctity of individual freedom and autonomy. Mary 
Shelley's own parents, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin, were important contributors to the 
discussion of rights that would become the dominant ideological framework for western societies up 
until the present day. Allied with the likes of Thomas Paine, they fought a war of words encouraging 
and defending the revolutions of America and France, while Edmund Burke, once a radical himself, 
defended the former upheaval yet condemned the latter. The upshot of this debate is one of the most 
impassioned and intelligent series of political works to be published: Burke's Reflections on the 
                                                 
2 In The Dialectic of Sex (1970), Firestone not only endorses Engels' advocacy of communal child-rearing, but goes on to 
argue that labs and incubators should replace traditional conception and gestation. 
3 See Okin's  Justice, Gender and the Family (1989), Nussbaum's Sex & SocialJustice (1999), MacKinnon's Toward a 
Feminist Theory of State (1989), and Bunch's A Broom of One's Own (1970). 
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Revolution in France (1790), Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), Paine's Rights of 
Man (1791), and Godwin's Enquiry concerning Political Justice (1793). In 1792, Wollstonecraft 
effectively established philosophical feminism with A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. The tone of 
the Vindication does not depart drastically from that of Paine and Godwin, but she breaks fresh ground 
by offering an account of social justice based on the experience of women, rather than one that silently 
assumes the perspective of an able adult male. 
 Among the less noble reasons for the development of liberalism was the need to develop a 
theory of rights that could rationalise the social changes brought on by the industrial revolution. 
Specifically, liberal rights are 
boundary markers which separate competing egoists in circumstances of avoidable scarcity, 
which absolve them of responsibility for each other's good, and which, through the coercive 
guarantees of the state, keep class conflict from erupting into outright class war, while at the 
same time helping to preserve the dominant class's control over the means of production. 
(Buchanan 163) 
A theory that considers individuals to be autonomous by default, free in the absence of overt coercion, 
and responsible for their own sustenance only is useful to an economy that prefers workers to compete 
with one another for their servitude and feel as though they have struck a good deal when hired. Once 
figures like John Locke and Adam Smith had articulated the political and economic philosophy of 
liberalism,4 ethical theories based on the new perspective began to be worked out. The two streams that 
would become equally important in liberal ethics are deontology, most famously formulated by 
Immanuel Kant, and utilitarianism. The latter was popularised by Jeremy Bentham, an acquaintance of 
                                                 
4 In Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689) and Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776). 
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Godwin, but most famously formulated by John Stuart Mill a generation later.5 
 According to Kant’s best known ethical work, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785), the rightness of an action must be measured by its 
universalisability. If one could will that action to be the same one taken by any person in any context, it 
is morally right. If the act could not be willed or conceived as universal, but only as an exception, then 
it cannot be moral. For example, theft is immoral, because if everyone stole, it would annihilate the 
system of private property, and without the recognition of property claims, “theft” would not be even 
possible as a concept. For Kant, an immoral act is discovered as such by showing that conceiving or 
willing it to be a universal leads to contradictions. Ethics is thoroughly a matter of reason. 
 Bentham and Mill are rationalistic in their ethics insofar as they feel a moral calculus is possible 
once the object of morality is established. However, they do not take the object of morality to be some 
sort of logical consistency of will and act as Kant does. Appealing to experience, they claim that the 
object of morality is happiness (defined as the absence of pain and maximization of pleasure), ideally 
the happiness of all who are affected by the action. This differs fundamentally from Kantianism in that 
the consequences are thought to determine the rightness of an action, not its logical implications. Act 
utilitarians could in fact claim that a different action may be required for different people in different 
circumstances (as long as the end is always the most happiness for the most people). There are also rule 
utilitarians who offer a compromise with deontology, arguing that the action which usually produces the 
happiest outcomes should be adopted as a rule.6 
 Although Kantians and utilitarians differ in their conception the role of reason, their theories are 
                                                 
5 See Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781) and Mill's Utilitarianism (1861). 
6 For a concise discussion of rule versus act utilitarianism and their relationships with deontology, see William K. 
Frankena's Ethics (1963). 
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both rationalistic and universalistic in nature, expecting moral judgements to be made impartially 
through the application of general rules to particular situations. Although such theories when applied 
ought to be useful for the improvement of society, the reverse has sometimes been the case. 
Utilitarianism, for example, underlies the reasoning of the growing bourgeoisie of Shelley's day that the 
plight of the working poor was redeemed by the quality of life the factory system afforded to the middle 
class. Kantianism, on the other hand, lends itself to a conservative outlook–it does not allow moral 
exceptions, and revolutions are exceptional by nature (one cannot will revolution as a universal—it is 
only revolution in contrast to a usual stability: eternal revolution would not be revolution at all, except 
perhaps in the sense of “revolution” that a planet or vinyl record goes through). Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both strains evolved but remained dominant in philosophical ethics. 
 By contrast, many late twentieth-century feminists are especially concerned with the denial of 
the cognitive/epistemic value of emotions that the dominant theories assume. According to Virginia 
Held, “for both kinds of theory we are to disregard our emotions in the epistemological process of 
figuring out what we ought to do” (25). Developed during the Enlightenment, these theories take the 
models of rational deliberation to be the public legislator or the participant in a marketplace. Such 
models are not only somewhat removed from the sorts of actual interpersonal moral reasoning people 
do in their daily lives, they are based on standpoints that at the time were only inhabited by men. Such 
theories ignore or outright denigrate the moral experience of those who are not in a position to be 
impartial or to consider only the rational principles involved. In lived morality (as opposed to moral 
theory) one has to deal with the consequences of choices regardless of whether the choice was made 
according to the best rational standards or under optimal conditions. Moral theories constructed to 
reflect the reasoning of the court and the marketplace should not be expected to adapt well to the 
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domestic sphere. 
 Although the features of the ethics of care are articulated differently by different theorists, such 
as its founding figures Sara Ruddick, Carol Gilligan, and Nel Noddings, several common values 
emerge. According to the ethics of care, ethical obligation is based on needs, dependency, and the 
nature of the relationship, not on exchange, pleasure, or abstract duty; care ethics focuses “on the 
compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we 
take responsibility” (Held 10). Not only does this mean that it is needs-based rather than rights-based, 
but that attachments to specific people should be considered before abstractions like “humanity” or 
“society” (Walker 523). For care ethics, the emotions are guides to correct moral action, not 
impediments; care ethics values emotion rather than rejects it, particularly in moral epistemology. The 
unequal, dependent relationship of a child and parent is taken to be the paradigm of ethical interaction, 
rather than an exception. For care ethicists, child rearing is where the ethical conscience is nurtured. 
Learning morality by rule memorisation or formulation is not considered adequate, for morality is not 
about rules, contrary to Kant and rule utilitarians–it is about the material needs of specific lives and 
making sure that those around one have these met. Reasoning about ethics, therefore, will not be a 
matter of considering an ideal judge or impartial hypothetical citizen behind a veil of ignorance.7   
Instead, “Concrete circumstances, the actual situations of people's lives, their relations to others 
and their moral characters, rather than abstract principles based upon assumed conditions (such as free 
individual choice), are the critical components of reasoning based upon an ethic of care” (Bartlett 1568-
69). Rather than conceiving of ethical dilemmas as arising when the desires of independent individuals 
                                                 
7  The “veil of ignorance” is a conceptual tool used by John Rawls to conceptualise the conditions required for a just 
society. As the most influential liberal theorist of the 20th century, influenced himself by both Mill and Kant, he is the 
specific target of many care ethicists’ critiques of liberalism. See his A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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come into conflict with one another, people are assumed to always already be enmeshed in 
relationships. Rather than place the burden of argument on claimants who would make demands of an 
agent, care ethics takes as given that all agents are already involved in relationships and that the nature 
of the relationship itself entails responsibilities between its members: “This conception of morality as 
concerned with the activity of care centres moral development around the understanding of 
responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to 
the understanding of rights and rules” (Gilligan 19). Because of the importance and inescapability of 
relationships, the ethics of care favours a restorative rather than retributive approach to justice and 
negotiation over conflict. 
 Virginia Held cites the founding works of the ethics of care as Sara Ruddick's essay “Maternal 
Thinking” (1980), Carol Gilligan's book In A Different Voice (1982), and Nel Noddings' Caring (1984). 
The first of these works brings maternal reasoning forward as a moral practice. The second articulates a 
distinct method of moral reasoning that stands in contrast to standard theories. The third examines 
closely the practices involved in the delivery of care. These three works set the parameters for 
subsequent thinking about the implications of the distinct concerns of care-giving practices for 
traditional ethical theories. Since judicial and economic models of reasoning assume autonomous 
agents, and these models are taken as paradigmatic by liberal ethicists, the reasoning of mothers stands 
in stark contrast. Maternal ethics deals not with autonomous equals testing competing claims, but with 
unequal relationships of dependency where one party may have far more responsibility than the other. 
Rather than allow this difference to undermine their theories, the dominant traditions have dismissed 
the reasoning involved in care as exceptional to the paradigm or as merely instinctive (Held 26). 
 The phrase “ethic of care” was coined not by a philosopher per se, but by psychologist Carol 
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Gilligan in her work In A Different Voice (1982). Approaching moral reasoning from a psychological 
developmental standpoint, Gilligan criticises work on moral development, specifically that of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, as masculinist and as privileging a certain approach to ethics (6). According to Kohlberg's 
work on child moral reasoning development, “progress” follows a regular pattern from self-centredness 
to concern for particular others to neutral, detached reasoning from principles. Not coincidentally, this 
reflects the hierarchy of moral awareness described in common ethical theories.8  The methodological 
flaw with his study, Gilligan points out, is that it examines only males. Her own study of female 
children reveals that rather than progressing toward increased detachment and abstraction, moral 
reasoning among girls becomes more contextual, relationship-oriented, and concerned to accommodate 
all parties in a conflict. Moral reasoning among girls studied tends to be expressed in terms of 
conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights (Gilligan 19).  
 According to Kohlberg, children start as egoists, and move through an attachment phase before 
progressing to more abstract reasoning. After a utilitarian phase, the top of Kohlberg's scale of moral 
progress includes viewpoints in close alignment with Kantian deontology and John Rawls's liberal 
theory of justice as fairness (so much so that this view of the moral is simply called “liberal morality” 
by most subsequent care ethicists). Such systems are predicated on equal treatment as a precondition of 
moral judgement or interaction despite the very different situations, needs, and constraints experienced 
by real people.  
The morality of rights is predicated on equality and centred on the understanding of fairness, 
while the ethic of responsibility relies on the concept of equity, the recognition of differences in 
need. While the ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims of other 
                                                 
8 Frankena endorses David Riesman's identification of moral stages: “tradition-directed,” “inner-directed,” “other-
directed,” and “autonomous.” 
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and self, the ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and 
care. (Gilligan 164-6) 
Attention to the kinds of reasons women studied give for their ethical positions reveals the limitations 
of abstract approaches to ethics. Whereas males interviewed respond to hypothetical ethical dilemmas 
by appeal to rules, women interviewed repeatedly respond with questions seeking further context 
(101).9 The implied stance of the males studied is one of confrontation and a disregard for personal 
attachments or circumstance when reasoning about conflict, whereas females appear to approach 
problems with a concern for the well-being of all parties involved and for the relationships between 
parties. Gilligan argues that this difference might explain the behaviour of many “heroic” male 
historical figures who were willing to sacrifice the well-being of their families, or bystanders, for an 
allegedly noble cause (104). Rather than promote the ethics of care as a superior alternative to 
mainstream ethical theories, however, Gilligan argues that an ethic of care and an ethic of justice are 
complementary. The will to preserve relationships at any cost can be as harmful as the pursuit of justice 
at any cost (100). This last point should pre-empt some of the charges that have been leveled against the 
ethics of care, but those who accuse care ethicists of being excessively uncritical of the justice of 
relationships may be thinking of the work of Nel Noddings or Virginia Held, who do take caring values 
to trump individualist values and considers the relationship to be at least as important as the people 
within it. 
 In Caring (1984), Nel Noddings sets out to analyse the implications of the alternative voice 
                                                 
9  Views on whether these differing values are socially conditioned or essential vary. My own is that the question of the 
origins of this difference is irrelevant to both the applicability of these values to moral life. Whether or not one feels that 
care ethics can stand without committing itself to gender essentialism, I see no reason that Shelley is committed to such a 
theory. After all, the caring values in her stories, while exemplified by women, are present in any character worth 
admiring. 
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uncovered by Gilligan and deduce its foundations. She argues that the rights-oriented view of morality 
commits a flaw from its outset: it seeks to justify caring and active duties toward others (as opposed to 
duties of non-interference). According to Noddings, “the moral viewpoint is prior to any notion of 
justification... We are not 'justified' –we are obligated–to do what is required to maintain and enhance 
caring. We must 'justify' not-caring” (95). The problem with the traditional philosophical approach to 
ethics is that it seeks an answer independently of the nature of our relationships for problems that arise 
precisely because we are in relationships with others. The question of taking care of others is not, 
according to her, one of justifying a dependent's claim on a caregiver, but one of how best to carry out 
what obligations arise from the very existence of inequality. Her work focuses on the dialogue and 
attentiveness between caregivers and those cared-for. Stating that “the caring that gives meaning to 
caretaking is too often dismissed as sentiment” (22), Noddings is emphatic that a stance of detachment 
is anathema to moral reasoning. 
 Noddings identifies dialogue, patience, and confirmation as “the great means of nurturing the 
ethical ideal” of caring in those being cared for (182). Noddings also stresses that one providing care is 
concerned as much with the relationship between caretakers and those cared for as with the parties 
themselves (3-5). Rather than seeking reciprocation, reward, or harmony with rational rules, caregivers 
seek completion in their relationships of care. While perfect reciprocity is impossible under conditions 
of inequality, to actively care for others is to nurture the ideal of caring itself. The one caring for a 
dependent sets an example for him or her, as well as any other witness to the relationship, who will then 
“turn about and act as one-caring in the circles and chains within which he is defined” (95). For 
Noddings, then, caring is aimed not only at the well-being of the cared-for and the preservation of 
particular relationships, but at its own promulgation as a value. One of her sharpest departures from 
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many feminists is that she doubts the socialisation theory of gender. Women's oppression, along with 
other social ills, on her account stems not from the training of women to be self-sacrificing, but from 
the exclusion of feminine values from the public sphere (129). 
 In Maternal Thinking (1989), Sara Ruddick challenges the dismissive attitude taken by 
traditional ethical theorists toward the work and moral reasoning of mothers. Neglecting childhood 
generally, the major streams of philosophical ethics–utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics– tend 
to start with the assumption that moral agents are independent able-bodied adults whose ethical 
obligations toward one another result from some sort of implied contract, rational derivation, or abstract 
ideal. Those who are dependent or disabled are treated as exceptions and those with dependents are 
considered to only be obliged insofar as they have agreed to the relationship. Within such a tradition, 
the work of mothers, when acknowledged at all, tends to be considered “instinctual” and therefore not 
subject to moral evaluation. In contrast to this tradition, Ruddick argues that mothering is not simply 
instinctive, that it requires deliberation, and that it is subject to moral evaluation. There are better and 
worse ways to mother. There are norms implicit in mothering. Specifically, a mother (whom Ruddick 
defines by the role, not the gender, so men could potentially mother) is responsible for the protection, 
nurturing, and training of children (23). Furthermore, Ruddick goes on to argue that the values implicit 
in good mothering ought to be held up as ethical norms for all human interactions. Not only are the 
values of caring worthy of attention by moral philosophers, but they ought to augment, or even 
supplant, other moral paradigms. 
 Although arising as a response to the devaluation of women's experiences in philosophy and 
psychology, care ethics has drawn criticism from feminist critics. Liberal feminists, such as Susan 
Moller Okin and Martha Nussbaum, worry that it endorses a “stereotypical image of women as selfless 
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nurturer” (Held 22) and rationalises the relegation of women to caring work. Others, including 
Catherine MacKinnon, Claudia Card, and Alison Jaggar, warn against uncritically enshrining moral 
ideals that have been formed under conditions of patriarchy.10 Although the ethics of care has come to 
enjoy much broader acceptance among feminists, it remains to be reconciled to deontology and 
utilitarianism, which are still the dominant frameworks within which scholarly work in ethics is 
conducted. Indeed, the ethics of care is omitted from some textbooks on ethics, and treated as a 
footnote in many others.11 
 A representative example of the liberal feminist perspective on maternity can be found in Susan 
Moller Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989), in which she joins Mary Wollstonecraft in her 
condemnation of Rousseau's apology for sexual inequality (Okin 33). In Émile (1762), Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau appeals to his own understanding of “natural” differences between men and women and 
essentially uses what Karen Warren would call “the logic of domination” to justify the subordination of 
one sex to the other.12 Like Wollstonecraft in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Okin argues that 
many of these alleged differences are fictional, as demonstrated in the time since Wollstonecraft. The 
reforms that Wollstonecraft had called for had been enacted with the result that more women published, 
more women attained positions of public power, and more women could live independently of men. 
However, despite advances in divorce law, child support, access to birth control, and some provisions 
for maternity leave, liberal society renders the necessary activity of procreation a serious burden on 
women and a barrier to their other pursuits. Unlike care ethicists, who argue that this is the result of an 
                                                 
10 See Card's and Jaggar's contributions to Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (1995). 
11   For example, Louis Pojman's Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (2002). 
12 In “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism” (1990), Warren describes the logic of domination as an underlying 
rationale for the subordination of nature that hierarchicalises moral duties on the basis of similarity and difference 
between the moral agent and the object of consideration. 
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undervaluation of the principles of care, Okin takes this to be due to a lack of attention to the principles 
of justice within families (110). 
 Because of this fundamental difference with care ethicists, Okin is critical of the movement and 
disagrees on a number of other points. She accepts that vulnerability is a necessity for children. This 
much “natural (and therefore unavoidable) vulnerability” (139) is morally permissible in her view, as is 
the mutual vulnerability of love. However, gender-structured marriage and the most common family 
arrangements subject women to “a cycle of socially caused and asymmetrical vulnerability” (138). This 
is socially caused because of an economic arrangement that fails to count reproduction and nurturance 
as work and so does not adequately compensate it (149). This vulnerability is asymmetrical because it 
places women in a state of economic dependence while the social expectation that she be the primary 
caregiver places demands on her by a dependent. Although the ethics of care may agree that society 
unfairly places caregivers in a disadvantaged position, its proponents tend to take issue with the implied 
undesirability of vulnerability and dependence. Because, unlike Okin, they take it to be unavoidable 
that we are all dependent and vulnerable in various ways (especially when a person is considered four-
dimensionally; although we may not all grow to be feeble, we did all start that way), they do not seek to 
eliminate dependency and vulnerability, but to divorce these from injustice. For the ethics of care, 
vulnerability and dependency are the very ground of morality; there are moral questions precisely 
because we have dependents, dependencies, and inequality. 
 Okin's explicit objections to the ethics of care include the empirical question of whether there 
really is a demonstrable difference in the moral reasoning of boys and girls, and on the theoretical 
question about whether there is a real distinction between care and justice (15). She does not explore 
the first challenge at length, although Gilligan's methodology has been questioned by others (Held 27). 
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Okin's short rebuttal to Gilligan is that even if a “feminine voice” could be found, it would not be clear 
how much this was the product of patriarchal conditioning. The second challenge is considered as part 
of an entire chapter defending John Rawls against common feminist criticisms (Okin 89). She argues 
that, although Rawlsian liberalism is guilty of neglecting to discuss the family, its principles apply and 
are compatible with feminist aims. As well, like Martha Nussbaum, she argues that accusations that 
liberalism denigrates sentiment are unfounded (Okin 99, Nussbaum 73). 
 Martha Nussbaum is unusual among liberal feminists for drawing as much on virtue theory as 
on deontology or utilitarianism, but her perspectives on law, society, and the family resemble those of 
mainstream feminism. Where liberal feminists tend to agree with other feminists in the critique of 
liberalism is on the claim that traditional liberal theory passes over the family and the fairness of the 
relations within it, often assuming as the neutral, natural, and normal individual someone independent, 
free to choose relationships, and who has someone else taking care of everything that does not involve 
the “public sphere.” The public/private distinction itself is also usually brought into question. Like 
Okin, Nussbaum would rather see the principles of justice applied to the family than what she considers 
the supererogative selflessness and uncritical sentimentalism of care ethics (74). 
 Although critical of liberalism, radical feminism tends to be even more distant from care ethics. 
Taking the form of class analysis, with men as the upper caste and women as the lower, radical 
feminism is less concerned with the piecemeal gains and policy proposals of liberal feminists and seeks 
instead to clean the slate of patriarchal concepts and relations. Catherine MacKinnon questions any 
gender-oriented values that are developed under conditions of oppression, going so far as to say that the 
caring attitude in women is “what male supremacy has attributed to us for its own use” (quoted in 
Bartlett 1569). Shulamith Firestone, in The Dialectic of Sex (1970), considers the family a source of 
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oppression, but differs (radically) from liberals in her proposals for transforming it: she proposes to 
replace reproduction with cloning and the family with the socialisation of child-rearing. Such positions 
rule out of hand the normativity of a woman's sense of duty to her specific children and extended 
family. The ideal of a world without birth should raise alarms for readers of Frankenstein. 
 Frankenstein became a popular novel for feminist study after Ellen Moers's Literary Women 
(1976) featured a chapter called “Feminine Gothic,” which pays especial attention to Mary Shelley. 
According to Moers, what sets Frankenstein apart from other Gothic novels is that, while many feature 
a persecuted heroine, this novel achieves its terror “without a heroine, without even an important 
female victim” (92). Although it is false to claim there is no important female victim in the novel, it is 
remarkable that in a genre populated by so many female authors writing tales of female agency, the 
daughter of the age's most famous feminist publishes a novel with only seemingly passive female 
characters. “Paradoxically,” says Moers, “no other Gothic work by a woman writer... better repays 
examination in light of the sex of its author. For Frankenstein is birth myth, and one that was lodged in 
the novelist's imagination... by the fact that she was herself a mother” (92). Although it resembles other 
tales of overreachers, such as Faust and Prometheus, “Mary Shelley's overreacher is different. 
Frankenstein's exploration of the forbidden boundaries of human science does not cause the 
prolongation and extension of his own life, but the creation of a new one” (95). Because of this goal, it 
would be hard to describe Victor as primarily an egoist. In fact, he continually uses ethical 
rationalisation throughout the novel. 
 Moers argues that Shelley works through her own anxieties about pregnancy by creating a male 
persona who comes as close as a male can to giving birth and then commits the most shocking act a 
new mother can: he abandons his offspring. On this reading, Shelley's tale is a response to the horrors 
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and consequences of giving birth, and it is “distinctly a woman's mythmaking on the subject of birth 
precisely because its emphasis is not upon what precedes birth, not upon birth itself, but upon what 
follows birth, the trauma of the afterbirth” (93). This is in contrast to the usual treatment of birth in 
novels by male authors, when birth is discussed at all, who tend to focus on “the happy maternal 
reactions: the ecstasy, the sense of fulfilment, and the rush of nourishing love which sweep over the 
new mother when she first holds her baby in her arms” (93). In this reading, Victor is an alias for Mary 
and gives voice to her anxieties about pregnancy. This draws out the distinctly feminine concerns of the 
novel, which had gone largely unremarked prior to Moers. 
 Mary Poovey seems skeptical of the feminist import of Frankenstein and takes it to be more a 
symptom of nineteenth-century gender norms rather than a critique. In The Proper Lady and the Woman 
Writer (1984), Poovey identifies two conflicting ideals that Shelley tries to live up to: that of the literary 
genius, and that of the proper lady (116). Poovey sees Shelley criticizing herself for her own self-
assertion, particularly in the 1831 edition as well as in all her later works. According to her view, 
Frankenstein follows the works of Wollstonecraft and the Romantics in its Promethean subject matter 
and focus on the individual overreacher, “but when Frankenstein is considered alongside contemporary 
works... it proves to be more conservative than her first readers realized,” since its critical target is, “not 
the social conventions that inhibit creativity, but rather the egotism that Mary Shelley associates with 
the artist's monstrous self-assertion” (122). Whereas Mary Wollstonecraft lauds independence and 
Percy Shelley sees creativity as a key to immortality, in Frankenstein, independence leads to isolation 
and creativity leads to death. For Poovey, the increased attention to domesticity in 1831 marks an 
increased distance from the intellectual influence of Wollstonecraft and Percy Shelley, and a “proto-
Victorian” ethic. Victor's world is destroyed by failing to acknowledge his interdependency with his 
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family. In the novel's associations between Victor's creation and authorship, there is a suggestion that 
Shelley, too, is transgressing her proper relations to family (138). This supports my own reading of the 
novel, at least part of it. However, I feel that Poovey misses Frankenstein's important distinctions from 
tales of egotism and fails to mine the full philosophical depth of the novel. Indeed, much of The Proper 
Lady and the Woman Writer is devoted to examining the personal circumstances that women authors 
are allegedly trying to cope with through their writing. If Poovey is to be believed, by 1831 Shelley is 
writing most of her novels as autobiographical apologies for writing and for her youthful transgressions 
(117). This undermines the authors themselves, who are not simply working out personal psychological 
issues, but have thoughtful social critiques to offer. In Shelley's case, this is critique not only of egoists 
but of the masculinist value-set that holds (the impossible dream of) autonomous accomplishment as a 
worthy goal. 
 The third of the works which set the terms for future feminist Frankenstein scholarship is Anne 
Mellor's Mary Shelley, Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (1988), which paints Mary Shelley 
conservatively and places her in opposition to Wollstonecraft, claiming that the former celebrates a 
form of “bourgeois domesticity” in Frankenstein (Mellor 39). According to Mellor, rather than propose 
revolutionary living arrangements or celebrate the free love ideals of the romantics, Shelley implies that 
the patriarchal family arrangement, exemplified by both the Frankensteins and the DeLaceys, is the best 
available source of happiness (88). Associating this emphasis on a good family life as a condition of 
happiness and the development of good character with the views of Edmund Burke, Mellor concludes 
that Shelley's view of the family is essentially conservative (86). Curiously, Mellor equates Burkean 
patriarchal domestic values with care ethics. Proposing in her essay, “Making a Monster: An 
Introduction to Frankenstein” (2003) that Frankenstein has an anti-revolutionary message, she implies 
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by the short comment she makes on care ethics that she considers it, too, essentially conservative (23). 
 A reading of the novel friendlier to care ethics, though not feminist in its focus, can be found in 
David Marshall's The Surprising Effects of Sympathy (1988). Starting with the oft-remarked satire of 
Rousseau's theory of human development in the Creature's narrative, Marshall also finds that many of 
Rousseau's traits revealed in Confessions and Reveries du promeneur solitaire (1782) are echoed in the 
character of Victor Frankenstein (Marshall 183-6). He also notes that Shelley devotes a large portion of 
her life of Rousseau (1839) to the topic of his child abandonment and that this is one of the few places 
where she takes an unsympathetic tone toward the philosophe (187). The position from which Marshall 
claims Shelley is criticising Rousseau is one rooted in Wollstonecraft's Vindication and Godwin's 
Enquiry (189). From this position, “Mary Shelley reflects on eighteenth-century accounts of sympathy 
and displays her own ambivalent assessment of the moral and aesthetic sentiments that are at stake” 
(182). According to Marshall, Frankenstein plays out Rousseau's theories of language and society in a 
kind of thought experiment. At stake is the sentimentalist view that the moral imperative derives from a 
felt affinity arising in communication with, or observation of others. 
 The novel's engagement with Rousseau is undeniable, and the influence of eighteenth-century 
philosophers of sentiment is likely, but Marshall's reading implies that Shelley's views can be reduced 
to those of her parents and the empiricists, passing over the particular way in which she detracts from 
her predecessors. Although he acknowledges the presence of feminist themes in the novel, he does not 
distinguish these from the broadly liberal themes to be found equally in the works of Godwin and 
Rousseau. Furthermore, Shelley's own moral conclusions Marshall takes to be “ambivalent” (182). I, on 
the other hand, will argue that her position is very clear considered in light of the ethics of care. It may 
appear ambivalent because it is nuanced and does not fit neatly in to the traditions that Marshall is 
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considering. It was also written before any clear articulation of the ethics of care existed. 
 Mary Shelley shares the basic premise of eighteenth-century theorists of sentiment, such as 
Rousseau, Burke, and Hume, all of whom she read between 1815 and 1818 (Journals I: 89-102), that 
ethical reasoning is as rooted in sentiment toward others as deliberation about matters of fact is rooted 
in observation of the world.13 This preference for a felt morality and sensed reality over theories of 
ethics and epistemology that rely on axioms and logical proofs is common ground for these empiricists 
and twentieth-century care ethicists. Although Shelley's view has sympathies with earlier influential 
thinkers such as Hume and Burke, it is still based more on maternal values than either of their fairly 
paternalistic systems and therefore more aligned with modern care ethics than either Humean ethics or 
Burkean theories of domesticity. Indeed, if Poovey is correct that “personal identity for [Shelley] entails 
defining oneself in terms of relationships (not one but many)–not, as Wollstonecraft and Wordsworth 
would have it, in terms of self-assertion, confrontation, freedom, and faith in the individualistic 
imaginative act” (126-7), then Mary Shelley's Frankenstein outlines the very (mostly gendered) 
division in ethical reasoning discussed by Carol Gilligan in In A Different Voice and developed since by 
theorists of the ethics of care. 
 One of the reasons that Shelley is better aligned with care ethicists than with her male 
forerunners is that the eighteenth-century concept of “sympathy” is too limited to cover the kinds of 
ethical relationships with which she is concerned. “Care” is a more active concept and carries more 
normative weight. If Victor Frankenstein is judged according to the terms of care ethics, the 
ambivalence alleged by Marshall and the shortcomings alleged by Poovey and Mellor disappear. I will 
                                                 
13 See Rousseau's Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (1754), Burke's Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, (1757), Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751), and Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). 
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contend that the debate between an individualistic ethic of entitlements and a relational ethic of 
obligation is what is at work in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Following the liberal spirit of inquiry and 
proceeding by the rationalistic rules of science, Victor Frankenstein creates a man without a childhood. 
The absurdity of the application of Victor's values to the role of parent is demonstrated in the effects it 
has. A caregiver without an ethic of care can ruin not only the cared-for, but the entire circles and chains 
of relationships that define oneself. Victor's monstrous motherhood, devoid of genuine caring skills and 
values, destroys him by destroying his family. In addition to the consequences of failures of caring, this 
underscores the relational nature of persons. 
 Virginia Held says, “Two individuals can be personally virtuous in the sense of having virtuous 
dispositions and yet have a relationship that is hostile, conflictual, and unhelpful to either” (53). It is my 
contention that this is a perfect description of Victor Frankenstein and his creature. Both possess a 
strong sense of justice and display signs of benevolence, but they relate to one another in such a way as 
to destroy both. Victor uses both utilitarian and deontological reasoning through the course of the story 
at times when they are not appropriate. Victor takes an oppositional masculinist stance against his own 
creation, debating who has what rights and who owes what to whom, without accepting the fact of their 
relationship, the unequal needs that the Creature has, and the moral imperatives those create. The 
Creature has clearer moral perception, borne perhaps of his inability to take family for granted, but can 
only express his claims in the patriarchal (and vengeful) language of Milton. Chapter Two will examine 
the influences in Victor's life and the many examples of caring from which he could have learned. 
Chapter Three will examine three masculine characters who bring about, or almost bring about, the 
death of all who are close to them: Victor, the Creature, and Walton.
 23 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Swiss Family Frankenstein: a model of temperate, thoughtful, caring relations 
 
 In Chapter One, I explained that care ethics has developed in response to the deficiencies and 
oversights of masculinist ethical theories, which include both utilitarianism and deontology, as well as 
renderings of the liberal conception of justice. Chapters Two and Three will provide a reading of 
Frankenstein as a critique of these theories, anticipating care ethics. This critique may be roughly 
divided into two components. The first is an analysis of caring good and bad. This includes the story of 
Victor's upbringing, his maturation, and his act of creation and abandonment. The second component is 
a critique of liberal masculinist moral reasoning. This aspect of the tale is rooted in Victor and the 
Creature's first verbal confrontation and is carried to the end of the story through Victor's pursuit into 
the Arctic. It is Walton who finally enacts the moral lesson by abandoning his pursuit of a place in 
history out of concern for the particular individuals dependent on him, namely his crew. The latter half 
of the novel will be the focus of Chapter Three. 
 In this Chapter, I will look at the first part of the novel, in which we see several examples of 
care and abundant commentary on different values. Various aspects of caring values and their 
masculinist contraries rise and re-emerge at different points in the story, some incidents examining 
many related values at once. Because of this fluidity, I have ordered the topics in this chapter by story 
character rather than by features of care ethics. To facilitate reading, I will remind the reader of the 
distinguishing features of care ethics and their contraries: ethical obligation is based on needs, 
dependency, and the nature of the relationship, not on debt or explicit contracts; the emotions are a vital 
part of moral epistemology, not extraneous; the claims of particular others for whom we take 
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responsibility take priority over those of strangers or “humanity” in general, contrary to the enlightened 
liberal ideal of impartiality; the child-parent relationship is emblematic of moral negotiation, not an 
exception as treated in masculinist theories; ethical conscience is nurtured through physical interactions 
in caring relationships, it cannot be adequately taught discursively; embodiment matters–ethical 
principles are derived from the material needs of specific people, not hypothetical situations involving 
detached judges; rather than conceiving of ethical dilemmas as arising when the desires of independent 
individuals come into conflict with one another, people are assumed to always be already enmeshed in 
relationships; because of the importance and inescapability of relationships, the ethics of care favours a 
restorative rather than retributive approach to justice. It is with these eight features of the ethics of care 
in mind that I will examine Victor Frankenstein and his relationships. 
 I will argue that different members of Victor's coterie represent different stages of removal from 
the values of care. Caroline Beaufort is the intelligent, responsible caregiver and Elizabeth Lavenza 
follows in her footsteps, serving as the moral voice in Victor's life after Caroline's passing. One remove 
further is Alphonse Frankenstein, who begins involved in public affairs, where domestic concerns meet 
broad universalistic reasoning, and settles in to domesticity as he matures. Family friend Henry Clerval 
has public aspirations and is concerned with his place in history, but he is always there for his friends 
and family. Despite all these examples to learn from, Victor fails in his own caring duties. Rejected by 
he who should have been his ethical nurturer, the Creature also fails to live morally; however, the 
Creature seems conscious of this, more so than his maker. Whether Victor comes to learn the lesson 
himself is unclear at the end of the story; it is left to Walton to translate this tragedy into a change of 
ethical course. 
 The first four chapters of the novel, following Walton's initial set of letters, are about origins. 
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They describe the origins of Victor's parents, of their relationship, of himself, of Elizabeth, of Clerval, 
and finally, of the Creature. Other than a passing reference to “a second son” (85), and Caroline's 
mention of “my younger children” (91), Victor's younger brothers are ignored until Chapter 6. In the 
first two chapters, various moral examples are presented of domestic affection, guardianship, 
caregiving, and filial gratitude. Mary Shelley's chart of moral progress appears to be the inverse of 
Kohlberg’s. The latter’s model regards the realm of politics a sphere of higher moral importance than 
domestic concerns, itself to be governed by higher principles derived from reason. Shelley's chart of 
moral progress in the novel is actually in the direction away from the abstract and universal. Alphonse 
Frankenstein begins in the realm of public affairs, but settles down to spend more time with his family. 
Contrarily, Victor Frankenstein spends a happy childhood deeply involved with his family, but his 
emotional retreat from them results in his moral decay. Caroline and Elizabeth remain constant to their 
loved ones; the Creature is never able to form a loving relationship and regards murder to be just. Never 
having experienced the physical intimacy of nurturing, he regards living bodies in the same detached 
manner that Victor regards the bodies of the dead. 
 Victor begins his account by naming both his geographic and genetic origins: “I am by birth a 
Genevese, and my family is one of the most distinguished of that republic.” He reveals that his family 
has traditionally been involved in the political sphere: “My ancestors had been for many years 
counsellors and syndics” and that his father spent much of his life “perpetually occupied by the affairs 
of his country” (80).  The first chapter of volume one presents the man Victor could have been: a 
compassionate husband and father. The only deviation between the 1818 and 1831 editions in the first 
paragraph of this chapter is in the last sentence, which refers to Alphonse's decision to marry. In the first 
edition, “it was not until the decline of life that he thought of marrying, and bestowing on the state sons 
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who might carry his virtues and his name down to posterity” (1818, 823). In 1831, “a variety of 
circumstances had prevented his marrying early, nor was it until the decline of life that he became a 
husband and the father of a family” (80). In the first edition, Alphonse is whole-heartedly involved in 
political life, and when he decides to settle down, the egoistic desire to pass on his name is cited as a 
factor in his decision. Note also that he is “bestowing on the state” his sons, suggesting that 
reproduction is in the service of an abstract entity: the state. The word “family” does not appear, nor 
does any feminine reference. By contrast, the 1831 edition describes him as a husband, indicating his 
role in relationship to a wife. Described as a “father of a family,” he is also placed in a role defined by a 
set of relationships. He is not just father “to” a family, but “of” it, and nowhere does this passage 
indicate a concern with the abstract concept, “posterity.” This suggests that as Shelley prepared the 
work for the new edition, she intentionally further developed the care argument. 
 As an example of a caring male, Alphonse is shown to be motivated by compassion and 
relatively unconcerned with masculine notions of honour and independence. When Beaufort, “One of 
his most intimate friends . . . a merchant who, from a flourishing state, fell . . . into poverty” (1831, 80), 
Alphonse endeavours to do what he can to help. Although Beaufort “was of a proud and unbending 
disposition and could not bear to live in poverty and oblivion in the same country where he had 
formerly been distinguished for his rank and magnificence,” Alphonse “deplored the false pride” that 
motivates Beaufort's retreat into obscurity. To him, friends should be there for one another, and 
dependency is nothing to be ashamed of. Indeed, he is insulted that Beaufort would rather live in 
poverty than ask for help, deeming such “conduct so little worthy of the affection that united them” 
(1831, 80). Rather than debate about who owes whom what, or extend an offer with an expectation of 
compensation, Alphonse believes that taking care of one's friends is just part of what friendship means. 
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Rather than admire the myth of the independent man, lauded by so many Romantics, Alphonse scoffs at 
it. 
 Alphonse's aid to the needy Beaufort also raises the issue of relationships and exchanges 
between unequals, something that has been named as a problem both for liberalism, which has been 
accused of ignoring power differences by feminists (Schwartzman 7), and some strains of feminism, 
accused of misconstruing the import of of power imbalances by care ethicists. The ethics of care 
assumes inequality rather than treating it as an exception. For care ethics, not only can there be ethical 
inequality, ethics is largely about how we treat our dependents and unequals. 
 Alphonse's decision to marry is an interesting example of the balancing of equality and 
difference in ethical relationships. Caroline Beaufort is the daughter of Alphonse's friend and much 
younger than Alphonse. She is also poor, and upon the death of Beaufort, orphaned. It might be 
tempting to suppose that the differences between a young poor orphaned woman and an older well-off 
man who has provided charity to the family render such a match exploitive, or at least in danger of 
being so. Yet, the “bonds of devoted affection” (Shelley 1831, 81) do not suppose material or physical 
equality nor equivalent reciprocity. Every moment of our lives we are dependent on others who are in 
various positions of power over us. In the earliest and latest stages of life, we are, hopefully, dependent 
on others with whom we share genuine bonds of affection. Alphonse's marriage is not motivated by 
aristocratic or bourgeois concerns of property, status, or advantage. Rather, he is touched by Caroline's 
devotion to her father in his weakest time. He is impressed by her “mind of uncommon mould” and her 
“courage.” His decision to marry her is “inspired by a reverence for her virtues and a desire to be the 
means of . . . recompensing her for the sorrows she had endured” (81-82). Rather than relying on her to 
tend to the household while he participates in public affairs, as in a common bourgeois marriage, 
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Alphonse “gradually relinquished all his public functions” (82) to better care for Beaufort and the 
grieving Caroline. His retirement also marks the beginning of a new family, for “immediately after their 
union they sought the pleasant climate of Italy,” where Victor, “their eldest child, was born at Naples.” 
This brings the discussion back to Victor's genetic origins. 
 Though he identifies himself as Genevese, Victor is in fact born in Italy, “that land of wonders” 
(82), reputed to have “restorative” powers, that seem to include fertility. From there, his family tours 
France and Germany. This tour is not dwelt upon, but still worth noting. Later in the novel, the German 
city of Ingolstadt is equated with alienation from natural sentiment, manifested both in the detached 
reason vaunted by the university and in Victor's macabre experiments. Here in Chapter One, Naples lies 
in a “land of wonders,” where babies are born, but that also has a reputation for passionate and ruthless 
political strife.14 France is characterised as a place of luxury, but also of strong class divisions and 
fickle justice, as shown in the story of DeLacey's exile (168). At the nexus of Italy, France, and 
Germany is Switzerland, characterized as a temperate, stable place next to its romance neighbours, yet 
compassionate in contrast to the Germans, who are only represented as professors of science. This 
reflects some of the appeal of republicanism for romantic idealists, but Shelley places the relationship 
of Alphonse and Caroline above the contractualism of republicanism by stressing that Alphonse leaves 
public office in favour of domesticity and that both leave rational Switzerland for passionate Italy to 
restore their spirits in the wake of death, and to create new life. 
 The character of Alphonse fades into the background in the rest of Victor's discussion of his 
family, which focuses more on the women. Although Alphonse is painted as an ideal caring father, there 
                                                 
14 Shelley's fascination with Italy, its tempers, and its intrigues is evidenced in such stories as “A Tale of the Passions,” 
“Recollections of Italy,” “The Bride of Modern Italy,” “The Sisters of Albano,” “The Brother and Sister: An Italian 
Story,” and “The Heir of Mondolfo,” (1828-39) as well as the novel, Valperga (1823). 
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is one place in the account of Victor's early life where the former meets with criticism. When 
confronted with Victor's curiosity, and seeing that Victor is studying such discredited natural 
philosophers as Agrippa and Paracelsus, Alphonse's reaction is to chastise Victor for wasting time. To 
this, Victor responds in a manner typical of teenage males: he does the opposite of what his father wills. 
Victor takes a moment in his recollection of this episode to remark that things may have gone 
differently had Alphonse approached the situation differently. It is the imperative form and dismissive 
tone of his father's admonition, “do not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash” (87), that spurs Victor 
on further. Had Alphonse taken the time to engage in dialogue, Victor avers that he would have listened 
and probably not gone any further down the path he takes. This reflects the charge care ethicists have 
made that masculine ethics and politics are too combative and that dialogue and relationship-
negotiating should be favoured over the adversarial approach seen in liberal jurisprudence. A contrast is 
seen in Henry Clerval's father who, although initially resistant to Henry's ambitions of more than book-
keeping, maintains an open mind and eventually comes to accept his son's wishes. It is not clear what 
Henry would have done had his father taken a more dismissive tone, but the case of Victor suggests that 
such confrontationalism may only serve to radicalise the one being rebuffed. 
 Although eminently admirable, Alphonse is shown by the above instance to be fallible. The fault 
is notably along the lines of typical masculine behaviour: confrontation. Caroline and Elizabeth, on the 
other hand are portrayed without flaws. Selfless heroines are typical of Shelley's fiction and of her 
contemporaries, so it is tempting to overlook this. However, in early nineteenth-century fiction, 
heroines are more often portrayed as self-sacrificing yet still dependent. In the gothic fiction tradition 
upon which Frankenstein draws, men in such stories will still usually end up saving the day. In the case 
of Frankenstein, in the absence of women, men are doomed. The story of Victor's age of innocence 
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closes with the death of Caroline. 
 Caroline is presented as flawlessly self-sacrificing and intelligently attentive to the needs of 
others. She is shown to place the highest value upon personal relationships and her act of passing on the 
moral stewardship of the family to Elizabeth (91) is given too prominent a place in the narrative to be 
passed over as incidental. She is introduced as not only a traditional dutiful daughter who tends to 
family at home, but also a breadwinner: “His [Beaufort's] daughter attended him with the greatest 
tenderness, but she saw with despair that their little fund was rapidly decreasing and that there was no 
other prospect of support . . . She procured plain work; she plaited straw; and by various means 
contrived to earn a pittance scarcely sufficient to support life” (81). In fact, Caroline is one of the few 
prominent characters shown earning an income. Alphonse is introduced at the point of retirement, 
Elizabeth lives a domestic life, and Clerval and Victor are still at the cusp of their careers. 
 This self-sacrificing characterisation may seem like a simple portrayal of a standard gender role. 
However, a few things distinguish Shelley's heroines from stock dutiful daughters. Caroline is shown to 
be forward, not passive, in her caring. She ambitiously goes out to find work to support her father. 
Later, she offers to adopt a girl who is not being offered, but whom she can see has needs this family is 
unable to meet, a family whose own needs are risked by trying to care for their ward. Her intelligence is 
stressed as one of the reasons for Alphonse's attraction to her. She also makes clear on her deathbed the 
importance of an intelligent responsible caregiver to the well-being of a family. 
 It is remarked in the narrative of the Frankenstein family that Caroline is generally caring, a 
“guardian angel to the afflicted” (83). It is also noted, however, that she places a special emphasis on 
those in particular relationships to her. This is borne out in her caring for her father, and also in her care 
for her daughter. When “the life of her favourite was menaced” (91), Caroline devotes herself, to the 
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point of sacrificing herself, to Elizabeth's recovery: 
Elizabeth had caught the scarlet fever; her illness was severe and she was in the greatest danger. 
During her illness many arguments had been urged to persuade my mother to refrain from 
attending upon her. She had at first yielded to our entreaties, but when she heard that the life of 
her favourite was menaced, she could no longer control her anxiety. She attended her sickbed; 
her watchful attentions triumphed over the malignity of the distemper – Elizabeth was saved, 
but the consequences of this imprudence were fatal to her preserver. (91) 
The story of Caroline's death is as important, and emphasised, as that of her life. There are four aspects 
of the circumstances surrounding her death that stand out in light of her role as exemplar of caring 
agent. The first is the manner in which she contracts the illness that kills her, namely by tending to her 
infectious daughter. The second is the deathbed request she makes of Elizabeth, to carry on tending to 
the needs of the family. The third is the relationship between her death and Victor's embarkation on the 
path to perdition–it is when he loses his mother that he turns his back on his particular duties in favour 
of the pursuit of universal truths. The fourth is the dream Victor has equating the birth of his creature 
with the death of both Caroline and Elizabeth. 
 As Elizabeth recovers, and just as Victor is set to leave for his studies at Ingolstadt, the fever 
overtakes Caroline. This juxtaposition of endings and beginnings will be echoed in the dream Victor 
has after bringing life to the Creature. In Caroline's last living appearance in the story, she stresses the 
importance of a feminine presence within the family unit by pleading, “Elizabeth my love, you must 
supply my place to my younger children” (91). Given Victor's statement that Caroline's illness is an 
“omen...of my future misery” (91), such an admonishment at the very moment that Victor starts on his 
trip to Ingolstadt can be seen as a warning of what will come of his pursuits and a foreshadow of the 
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murders of the other Frankensteins. 
 The moral paradigm exemplified by Caroline's act of caring for Elizabeth now falls to the latter 
to express, a role she takes up immediately: “She indeed veiled her grief and strove to act the comforter 
to us all” (92). Victor's departure for Ingolstadt also means a departure from this source of comfort and 
moral guidance. When the mantle of the maternal role is passed to Elizabeth, Victor acknowledges 
momentarily how significant his mother was in his life and how much a part of himself: “It is so long 
before the mind can persuade itself that she whom we saw every day and whose very existence 
appeared a part of our own, can have departed forever” (92). Shortly after this acknowledgement of 
interconnectedness, Victor leaves. This is both a physical and symbolic departure from his family. Not 
only is he going away to study, but in choosing this path, he begins his alienation from the “old familiar 
faces” that characterise his happy earlier life: “I was now alone” (93). This isolation only increases 
proportionally to Victor's obsession. To his own detriment, he even neglects his correspondence with 
home. 
 Victor's relationship to Elizabeth is very complex, and slightly different between editions of the 
novel. In the 1818 edition, she is a cousin come to live with the family. In the 1831 edition, she is 
adopted from a peasant family who themselves were foster parents to her. What is distinctly more 
interesting about this latter version, from the perspective of care ethics, is that it shows that caring 
concern for others can go beyond those immediately related to oneself, and across differences of 
genesis, as Elizabeth is the daughter of Milanese nobility, fostered by peasants and finally adopted by a 
Swiss family. Her mother having died giving birth, Elizabeth begins her life in a similar fashion to the 
Creature: motherless and proximate to death. The attention paid in the novel to the adoption of 
Elizabeth also highlights the importance of a caring upbringing (Elizabeth does not grow up alone in a 
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hovel sleeping on straw, unlike the Creature). As well, it provides an example of the salience of needs–
Caroline finds a family “distributing a scanty meal to five hungry babes” (83),15 and feels drawn to care 
for one who stands out to her. 
 Victor and Elizabeth are raised together, yet their adult relationship is romantic in nature. This is 
not the sole instance of blurred family-lover lines or other complex relationships in Shelley's writing.16 
Rather than take this at a superficial interpretive value and assume it to indicate a preoccupation with 
incest, whether for psychological or philosophical reasons, it is more productive to treat it as indicative 
of an interest in the commonalities and differences between all forms of relationship. Indeed, in the 
1831 edition, Victor identifies “cousin” as an apt term of endearment for the same person he goes on in 
the next sentence to speak of in the language of wedding vows: “We called each other familiarly by the 
name of cousin. No word, no expression could body forth the kind of relation she bore to me – my 
more than sister, since till death she was to be mine only” (84). This passage also reveals that Victor's 
attitude even toward loved ones takes a tone of ownership, predicting the tone he later takes toward his 
creature. 
 As she grows, Elizabeth is presented as a contrast to Victor. She is associated with the natural 
and humanistic. She has a deep love for nature as it is, “the sublime shapes of the mountains, the 
changes of the seasons, tempest and calm, the silence of winter, and the life and turbulence of our 
Alpine summers – she found ample scope for admiration and delight,” as well as for “the aerial 
creations of poets” (85). This shows a fondness for the living and for the sentimental. Contrarily, 
Victor's interest in nature is not as a realm of discrete objects and life forms that can be appreciated for 
                                                 
15 All further references will be to the 1831 edition. 
16 Family is a central theme in most of Shelley's work. Her families are often portrayed in disrupted or warped condition, 
whether through a falling out, as in Lodore, incestuous sentiment, as in Mathilda, or outright rejection, as in 
Frankenstein. 
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their distinctive qualities, but as the manifestations of more important universal laws: 
While my companion contemplated . . . the magnificent appearances of things, I delighted in 
investigating their causes. . . Curiosity, earnest research to learn the hidden laws of nature, 
gladness akin to rapture, as they were unfolded to me, are among the earliest sensations I can 
remember. (85) 
The difference between these two “cousins” parallels the difference between the care approach, which 
focuses on context and uses the emotions as moral cues, and the justice approach, which judges 
situations based on universal rules abstracted from living (akin to the natural philosopher's “hidden 
laws of nature”) and considers an ideal judge to be cool and strictly rational. Victor acknowledges the 
importance of Elizabeth's influence, “I might have become sullen . . . rough . . . but that she was there 
to subdue me” (86-87), but rejects this influence while shut up in his Ingolstadt apartment, paying “no 
visit to Geneva” (98) for two years. 
 This isolation from his family is only interrupted after Victor's creation has run off, when 
Clerval brings him a letter from Elizabeth. In this letter, the image of the bedside is evoked once again: 
“I figure to myself that the task of attending on your sickbed has devolved on some mercenary old 
nurse, who could never guess your wishes nor minister to them with the care and affection of your poor 
cousin” (112). The example set by Caroline is what Elizabeth wishes to follow now, and take care of 
her loved one. Note also the reference to personal intimacy as a form of specialised knowledge. 
Because she knows Victor intimately, she is best qualified to attend to his particular needs. Caroline 
demonstrates particularity as a form of attachment in her favouritism of Elizabeth; Elizabeth describes 
particularity as a type of specialised knowledge. 
 This letter is also very significant for its presentation of the cycle of life in action. After Victor 
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has missed the passing of seasons, he also misses the growth of his siblings. Ernest, despite the 
protestations of his family, wishes to enter the foreign service. In a demonstration of caring compromise 
and concern for what best suits the cared-for, the family is inclined to consent: “I fear that he will 
become an idler unless we yield to the point and permit him to enter the profession which he has 
selected” (112). Meanwhile, the younger William “is very tall for his age,” and unlike his adult brother, 
“has already had one or two little wives” (114) (author's emphasis). As Victor has just completed a 
perverse route to the creation of life, Elizabeth reminds him of the ordinary route, leaving as the last 
piece of news, that “The pretty Miss Mansfield, has already received the congratulatory visits on her 
approaching marriage,” and adding with a sore tone, “Her ugly sister, Manon . . . married last autumn” 
(114). As far as Elizabeth is concerned, the cycle of growth and reproduction is very much a social and 
interpersonal thing, not an object of scientific study. She also clearly sees participation in this cycle as a 
completion; the question for her is not whether, but when. It is characteristic of Elizabeth that she is 
virtually unable to imagine well-being in isolation. For this reason, she implores Victor to accept the 
company of Henry Clerval.  
 Clerval is very similar to Victor, but just grounded enough to steer clear of radical enterprises. 
He appreciates risk and romance, chivalry and songs, but he takes these up in the form of literature. 
Clerval seeks to be a “benefactor of our species” (86), a loftier goal than the civic functions performed 
by Alphonse, but still within the social realm of commerce and politics, and far less grandiose than 
Victor's plan to create “A new species” (101-2). He also differs in that his interest stays broad yet 
secondary to his concern for friends and family, while Victor obsesses on one thing and prioritises it 
above all else. Clerval is in many ways the young man that Victor could have been. He shares Victor's 
curiosity and enthusiasm, but has a playful manner that prevents obsession and does not hesitate to 
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respond to those in need of care, as evidenced by the time he devotes to Victor in Ingolstadt. 
Considering also that “Clerval had never sympathized with my tastes for natural science and his literary 
pursuits differed wholly from those which had occupied me,” echoing a difference between Victor and 
Elizabeth, he could be seen as a compromise between the two. 
 Clerval's friendship with the Frankenstein family has a long history, and he too is influenced by 
Elizabeth in his development, sharing her interest “in the moral relation of things” (86). He functions as 
a brother, standing in for Victor's family at their request both during his post-partum recovery and on 
his trip to England to do research towards creating a female (198). In fact, Clerval gets far more 
attention in the novel than either of Victor's blood-brothers. Although Victor is passionate in his love for 
his adult equals, Clerval and Elizabeth, the young ones seem peripheral to his world. This suggests that, 
like liberal political theory, he does not pay attention to the vulnerable and dependent.  
There is little mention of Henry's own family, so it is probably significant that when his father is 
mentioned, it is in the context of an incident that parallels a father-son conflict experienced by Victor 
and Ernest. Henry's father is disappointed in Henry's ambitions. However, instead of harshly dismissing 
the youth's dreams, as Alphonse does in his scorn of Victor's alchemical readings, “his love of me at 
length overcame his dislike of learning, and he has permitted me to undertake a voyage of discovery to 
the land of knowledge” (108). Like Alphonse with Victor, Henry's father initially objects to his son's 
pursuits. However, as Alphonse does with Ernest, he keeps the channel of communication open and an 
agreement is reached. Henry's father is not overprotective or domineering but still supportive and 
concerned. 
 This delicate balance is reflected in Clerval's care of his friend. He does not prescribe a path to 
recovery for Victor; rather, he responds to Victor's needs as they become apparent: 
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When I was otherwise quite restored to health, the sight of a chemical instrument would renew 
all the agony of my nervous symptoms. Henry saw this and had removed all my apparatus from 
my view. He had also changed my apartment, for he perceived that I had acquired a dislike for 
the room which had previously been my laboratory. But these cares of Clerval were made of no 
avail . . . (115) 
Clerval's caring skills further stand out in contrast to the insensitive professor, Waldman, who “inflicted 
torture when he praised . . . the progress I had made in the sciences,” and with his dull emotional 
cognition, “attributed my feelings to modesty . . . He meant to please, and he tormented me” (115). By 
contrast, “Clerval, whose eyes and feelings were always quick in discerning the sensations of others, 
declined the subject, alleging, in excuse, his total ignorance” (115). Yet, despite the fact that Clerval is a 
good caregiver, and the closest friend to Victor, the latter will not confide the reasons for his distress. 
 Part of Victor's difficulty with caring relationships is that these require dialogue to be successful 
and he struggles with communication throughout the novel. To begin with, he does not share the 
humanistic inclinations of Elizabeth and Clerval:  
I confess that neither the structure of languages, nor the code of governments, nor the politics of 
various states possessed attractions for me. It was the secrets of heaven and earth that I desired 
to learn; . . . physical secrets of the world. (86) 
The consequence of this preference for the universal is more than trivial. While he is shuttered in his 
lab, Victor's behaviour suffers the flaws of masculinist ethics in the following ways: he neglects 
particular (concrete) others, namely his family, in service of humanity (abstract others) and posterity 
(abstract self); he understates the importance, moral and epistemic, of embodiment, separating himself 
from nature through an objective, clinical stance; following from his neglect of the process (not just the 
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“spark”) of life, he ignores the necessity of childhood, as well as the maintenance of relationships. The 
moral decline of Victor is the moral of the story. He begins with the advantage of a loving family, but he 
rejects their example. He is offered the advice of friends and does not take it. The further he alienates 
himself from his domestic roots, the more Elizabeth tries to pull him back, but he resists. Even after 
creating life from the remains of the dead, when he is offered opportunities to take responsibility, such 
as when the Creature approaches his bed and in the alpine confrontation, he refuses. Care ethicists point 
out that masculinist ethics, rather than create peace through dialogue aimed at reconciliation, creates 
further discord and resentment through its blame-oriented system of judgement. The confrontation 
between Victor and the Creature, debated in the language of rights, is less concerned with how to 
accommodate the relationship that exists than with who owes what to whom. Chapter three will focus 
on the rationale of justice used by Victor and the Creature. The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to Victor's shortcomings by the standards of care ethics, up to the transgression that sets the 
train of horrors in motion: his rejection of the Creature. 
 As has been shown repeatedly in reference to Victor's pursuit of science, he is inclined to neglect 
such particulars as people, politics, and history in favour of the study of nature's universal laws. This 
attitude begets two perverse motivations for reproduction, one selfish, “A new species would bless me 
as its creator” (101), and one partly altruistic, “what glory would attend the discovery if I could banish 
disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!” (88) In each 
case, his concern is with two universals: a species and history. Either way, he is not considering his 
creation itself, the particular other who will be in a dependent relation to him. 
 Victor's misunderstanding of the importance and the ethics of relationships manifests in many 
ways. Not only does he fail in his relationship with his progeny, he harms himself by failing to realise 
 
 
39 
 
his own dependency on and constitution by others. Having literally constructed a being out of the parts 
of others, one might expect Victor to reflect more on the ways in which people are interpersonally 
constituted. The question of who one is will largely be answered through a description of one's 
relationships. The Creature, who is the most observant character in the story, has seen the meaning of 
family and friendship and knows what it is like to be without it. It is to be nameless–a non-person. 
Using this knowledge, the Creature destroys Victor by destroying his relations. 
 Because of his blindness to the significance of relationships, even his betrothed, Victor takes a 
long time to realise the Creature's strategy. Even immediately after having destroyed the Creature's 
would-be bride, when the Creature promises, “I shall be with you on your wedding night” (213), Victor 
assumes this is a threat of violence to his own body: 
That, then, was the period fixed for the fulfilment of my destiny. In that hour I should die and at 
once satisfy and extinguish his malice. The prospect did not move me to fear; yet when I 
thought of my beloved Elizabeth, of her tears and endless sorrow when she should find her lover 
so barbarously snatched from her . . . I resolved not to fall before my enemy without a bitter 
struggle. (213) 
Although Victor still fails at this point to fully grasp the significance of others in the constitution of 
oneself, he does become more appreciative of his relationships with each loss, describing his father's 
visit after the murder of Clerval, “like that of my good angel,” empowering him to “gradually recover 
my health” (225). This is in fact the final of many occasions throughout the novel (Caroline for 
Elizabeth, Elizabeth for Caroline, Clerval for Victor) where the best palliative for an illness is the 
attention of a loved one. 
 This connection between family and health may explain how Victor's isolation from his family 
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contributed to his moral sickness, his blindness to the concrete consequences of his abstract pursuits. 
Rather than investing his emotions in his relations, “Two years passed . . . during which [Victor] paid 
no visit to Geneva, but was engaged, heart and soul, in the pursuit of some discoveries which [he] 
hoped to make” (98). After enough time spent in objective study, free of the emotional fetters of 
particular people, free also of “superstitions,” Victor is prepared to “examine the causes of life” by 
“recourse to death” (99). In the process, he treats “mere bodies deprived of life,” as so much “food for 
worms,” and fodder for experimentation. This objective, objectifying attitude toward flesh is what 
Ruddick accuses “militarist[s]” (187) of in Maternal Thinking. In discussing the connection of 
masculinist thinking to war, she notes that “women tend to know, in a way and to a degree that many 
men do not, both the history and the cost of human flesh” (186). Every adult body part has a history that 
includes a name, a family, and a lot of caring labour to grow the person to which it belonged. 
 During Victor's study of life through death, he misses out on opportunities to study life through 
life. Not only is he isolated from his family, but when he embarks on his creation, he loses touch with 
the rest of the cycle of life. He falls out of phase with the days, “as I proceeded and soon became so 
ardent and eager that the stars often disappeared in the light of morning whilst I was yet engaged in my 
laboratory” (98), and eventually the seasons: 
 The summer months passed while I was thus engaged, heart and soul, in one pursuit. It was a 
most beautiful season; never did the fields bestow a more plentiful harvest or the vines yield a 
more luxuriant vintage: but my eyes were insensible to the charms of nature. (102) 
As Victor ironically ignores nature in his study of nature, he also ignores his “human nature,” the 
emotional/somatic cues that he is doing something wrong: “often did my human nature turn with 
loathing from my occupation, whilst, still urged on by an eagerness which perpetually increased, I 
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brought my work near to a conclusion” (102). The eagerness to realise an idea overrides the gut feeling 
that this is wrong. It is as though “human nature” (conscience) is an impediment to great achievements. 
Again there are echos of Ruddick's critique of militaristic rationale, but this is also an example of 
masculinist neglect of the value of emotions in making ethical decisions. 
 Of the motivations that spur Victor's decisions, concern for the Creature, before or after 
creation, does not seem to factor in. While Victor does aim for beauty (105), this may well be for his 
own sake; he refers to Elizabeth in the language of a pretty possession, and it is possible he has a 
similar attitude, pre-partum, toward his creation. As for the Creature's proportions, “the minuteness of 
the parts formed a great hindrance to my speed,” so he makes “a being of a gigantic stature” (101), a 
purely utilitarian consideration, and one that significantly neglects the effects such a frame is going to 
have on this being's ability to develop human relationships. Whereas Caroline Beaufort adopts and 
cares for Elizabeth because she is moved by the needs of that particular individual, Victor is moved to 
bring a new life into his by curiosity, ego, and the alleged greater good. Whereas Caroline's reward is 
the survival of and continued relationship with her ward, Victor awaits a “glory” that would follow his 
conquering of death (88). For Caroline, death is a very real threat that must be warded off through 
attentive care to the sick; for Victor, “Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds which I should first 
break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world” (101) (my emphasis). While seeking the 
principle of life, Victor fails to understand the process of life. 
 In endeavouring to engineer life, Victor is taking a very circumambulatory route to that which 
he could accomplish much more naturally, traditionally, and pleasantly with Elizabeth. Indeed, this 
point cannot be stressed enough, for as Moers points out, “Frankenstein is a birth myth, and one that 
was lodged in the novelist's imagination . . . by the fact that she was herself a mother” (90). Having left 
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the moral influence of women behind in Geneva, Victor seeks to also make life without their 
involvement. Like ethical theories developed without the input of women, his theory of life fails to take 
into account the necessity of childhood. 
 Like the ethicists associated with the liberal tradition, Victor neglects the position of childhood 
within the development of personhood. In fact, he never seems to stop to think about what this Creature 
will do or say when it awakes or how he will set about educating it. There is a gap in Victor's plan 
between imparting the spark of life and receiving the adulation of a new species. It is as though the life 
of the Creature is incidental to the plan and its education and nurturance (has Victor considered its diet? 
Does he expect it to arise already toilet trained?) are non-considerations. 
 Victor's revulsion finally overtakes his eagerness at the moment where he has entered the 
unconsidered zone of his great plan: the life of his progeny. When the Creature awakes Victor from his 
feint, it reaches out, grinning, uttering “inarticulate sounds” (106) like a newborn. It is at this moment 
that Victor is offered the opportunity to take up responsibility for his creation and it is here that he 
refuses. While there is some merit in interpreting this as a form of ablism–Victor is unable to accept the 
deformation of his child–I take this as Victor's response to the incongruity between ideal and real. 
Victor has envisioned an ideal creation, one who would sire a race that would be grateful to him as its 
creator. He had assumed his creature would be handsome and articulate. At the conclusion of his 
efforts, finding that his creation is not beautiful, “the beauty of the dream vanished and breathless 
horror and disgust filled my heart” (105) and he collapses not only from the shock of having his vision 
shattered, but also under the weight of the realization that he is responsible for this thing. He (Victor) is 
the one who has to teach it language, clean up the messy lab, and answer for its presence in the world. 
Far from being at the fruition of his labours, his labours have only just begun. His response is to run. 
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 Feminist critics of liberal individualism have pointed to the ideals of independence and 
autonomy as dreams borne of male privilege. Because men are positioned to walk away from a 
pregnancy and an infancy, their conception of ethics assumes this kind of privilege. Victor is a man who 
has taken these privileges for granted and now has to face the burden of motherhood. 
 Our judgement that Victor fails as a parent can be predicated on the characterisation of good 
parenting he gives when describing his own childhood: 
I was . . . the innocent and helpless creature bestowed on them by heaven, whom to bring up to 
good, and whose future lot it was in their hands to direct to happiness or misery, according as 
they fulfilled their duties towards me. With this deep consciousness of what they owed towards 
the being to which they had given life, added to the active spirit of tenderness that animated 
both, it may be imagined that while during every hour of my infant life I received a lesson of 
patience, of charity, and of self-control, I was so guided by a silken cord that all seemed but one 
train of enjoyment to me. (82) 
With this example before him of fulfilling one's duties toward the helpless whom one has given life, 
Victor ought to have responded differently to his creature's approach. Yet, although “My mother's tender 
caresses and my father's smile of benevolent pleasure while regarding me are my first recollections” 
(82), it is the Creature who smiles at Victor, and the reaction is horror. 
 It is generally assumed that the great transgression committed in the novel is the creation of life 
through artificial means, whether this is assumed wrong as a violation of natural law, or wrong because 
it is the action from which all subsequent tragedy follows. Viewed as an argument for the ethics of care, 
however, the great transgression in Frankenstein is Victor's rejection of his creation. After all, if Victor 
had taken up the Creature's hand at his bedside and accepted the role of caring parent, there is no reason 
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to suppose any murder spree would have followed. 
 Symptomatic of his unnatural transgressions, the nightmare to which Victor succumbs after 
completing his labours blurs love and horror, life, sex, and death:  
I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt. Delighted 
and surprized, I embraced her, but as I imprinted the first kiss on her lips, they became livid with 
the hue of death; her features appeared to change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my 
dead mother in my arms; a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw grave-worms crawling in the 
folds of the flannel. (106) 
Although this dream can been given many interpretations, what is impossible to ignore is the 
identification of Elizabeth with Victor's dead mother. I have argued that Caroline represents care. Taken 
together, that identification, the associations within this dream, and its placement between the creation 
and the rejection suggest the following: Elizabeth is life, “the bloom of health”; Victor could make new 
life in her embrace but instead has embraced death (objective/objectified matter) as the source of life; in 
so doing he has rejected the values that originally nurtured him. This symbolic rejection in his dream 
portends the actual rejection of his creature and of his responsibilities when he awakes. As an eventual 
result, the symbolic death of Elizabeth is also realised. 
 This dream contains the final mention of Caroline. It is here that the principles of caring have 
been turned on their head and Victor's life begins to unravel. What I have discussed in this chapter is 
mostly origins and how the principles of caring are displayed or violated in the growth of 
Frankenstein's major characters. Chapter Three will focus on the Creature's development and the 
masculinist rationale underlying much of his and Victor's moral judgement.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A Case of Entitlement: how the logic of rights hastens Victor's tragedy 
 
 Victor, Walton, and the Creature all represent varying degrees of masculinism and of self-
awareness. In this chapter, the Creature will be presented as the most aware of the three. His situation of 
having observed care but been denied it allows him to know what it is and its value. Victor and Walton, 
on the other hand, have led privileged lives and under-appreciate not only the caring work done for 
them by others, which is typical of patriarchal attitudes toward caring work, but also their own duties 
and the ethics of care itself. Victor comes to a realisation of the value of relations and how they have 
supported him up until their deaths. However, after rejecting dialogue or compromise, only to lose all 
his loved ones, he still fails to achieve an appreciation of reconciliation and dies demanding justice, 
understood in one of its masculinist senses: retrubution. Walton, on the other hand, is more appreciative 
of his family from the beginning, and ends up making the right decision according to care ethics by 
putting the lives of the crew before the “inestimable benefit” (64) to humanity that could come of his 
voyage. He also demonstrates a willingness to engage in dialogue, conversing with the Creature instead 
of carrying out Victor’s dying wish of assassination. However, at the end of the tragic novel, Walton 
still expresses masculinist values. 
 The creature begins life innocent and full of wonder, but fully formed physically. Chapter 11 
describes the development of his senses from “a strange multiplicity of sensations” in which he “saw, 
felt, heard, and smelt at the same time” (148) to fully functional senses and balance all in the space of a 
paragraph. Over the next several pages, he learns to forage and use fire. The reflection of Rousseau's 
“natural” man is clear: this is a man in the state of nature as Rousseau supposes in his Discourse on the 
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Origins of Inequality Among Men (1754) going about his solitary business between mates, unspoiled by 
the corrupting influence of civil society, “dependent on none and related to none” (174). Rousseau’s 
image of wild humanity is not confirmed by modern anthropology, and certainly doubted by Mary 
Shelley, who states in her Life of Rousseau that “nothing can be more unnatural than his natural man” 
(337). In Frankenstein, this solitary individual, unburdened by relations or dependencies, is shown to be 
a grotesque reflection of humanity. Victor rejects society and becomes a monster. The Creature is 
monstrous because rejected. All the examples of healthy, happy humans are those who are surrounded 
by family. 
 There are two sets of values the Creature is taught as he spends his time in his hovel spying on 
the DeLaceys. One is what could broadly be termed a “republican” stream, including the values implicit 
in the political histories of Plutarch and Volney, as well as the values arising from the conversation 
between liberalism and Christianity in Paradise Lost. By the histories, the Creature is taught that “To be 
a great and virtuous man appeared to be the highest honour that can befall a sensitive being” (164-5). 
Both Milton’s Satan and Adam provide examples of individual dignity and the idea of a compact 
between creator and created. Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther also contributes to this side of the 
Creature’s value-set: despite examples of “gentle domesticity” (173), it confirms the masculinist 
characterisation of emotions as overpowering forces praiseworthy only when tied to “lofty” (174) ideals 
(such as Victor’s passion for science). The Creature’s description also implies a statement about the 
values of “great men”: “I read of men concerned in public affairs, governing or massacring their 
species” (174). The morality of public life involves control over the lives of others, quite like 
parenthood, but unlike children, citizens are to be considered impartially. Lives may be weighed in 
cost-benefit analyses and strong cases made for the elimination of thousands. By contrast, the ethics of 
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care might recommend a course with a lower overall utility, as long as it preserves the relationships 
involved. The sharing of poverty by the DeLaceys, as well as their quitting their cottage as a family in 
order to (they believe) preserve the life of the family father, whom they believe to be in danger from the 
Creature, shows the importance to humans of their relationships. 
 It is from the DeLaceys that the Creature learns the value of family and the nature of caring 
relations: “Nothing could exceed the love and respect which the younger cottagers exhibited towards 
their venerable companion. They performed towards him every little office of affection and duty with 
gentleness, and he rewarded them by his benevolent smiles” (156). This is a contrast to the picture of 
humanity painted by the republican histories, which barely mention family life at all. The histories 
written by men focus primarily on conflict and conquest, so much so that the moments of nobility are 
surprising: “Was man indeed at once so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and 
base?” (165) There appears to be a jab in this part of the Creature’s narrative at Godwin’s anarchism: 
“For a long time I could not conceive how one man could go forth to murder his fellow, or even why 
there were laws and governments; but when I heard details of vice and bloodshed, my wonder ceased 
and I turned away with disgust and loathing” (165). The sort of relations discussed in such histories are 
mostly based on treaties, and power differences usually result in exploitation in absence of a formal 
justice system. Even Paradise Lost implies that the creator-created relationship is a kind of compact in 
which the weaker party is granted rights by the stronger and loses them if the agreement is violated. 
However, there is a compatiblist suggestion that care combined with principles of governance could 
result in a more stable and happy society: “I was led to admire peaceable lawgivers . . . The patriarchal 
lives of my protectors caused these impressions to take hold in my mind” (175). Furthermore, the 
Creature criticises the same militaristic values that are also the target of much of Ruddick’s work: 
 
 
48 
 
“perhaps, if my first introduction to humanity had been made by a young soldier, burning for glory and 
slaughter, I should have been imbued with different sensations [than a preference for peace]” (175). It is 
not that human society is inherently warlike, nor is it peacefully self-regulating. Rather, as a large web 
of relationships, it requires constant upkeep in the form of compassionate dialogue and tending to the 
vulnerable. 
 Also omitted from the great works the Creature reads are descriptions of the life process. This 
he learns through observation of the DeLaceys, learning the word “father” (158) in a caring context: 
Other lessons were impressed upon me even more deeply. I heard of the difference of sexes, and 
the birth and growth of children; how the father doated on the smiles of the infant, and the lively 
sallies of the older child; how all the life and cares of the mother were wrapped up in the 
precious charge; how the mind of youth expanded and gained knowledge; of brother, sister, and 
all the various relationships which bind one human being to another in mutual bonds. (166) 
The role of the father in this passage is to “doat,” not to command allegiance and awe as Victor or 
Milton’s God would.17 The mother does the mothering, all her “cares . . . wrapped up in the precious 
charge.” It is easy to read this as the “patriarchal” scene it is explicitly referred to later. However, it is 
important to note the characteristics of the family emphasised. The family works together for their 
mutual benefit out of mutual love, not because they have come together for mutual advantage, as in a 
liberal account of the origins of society, but because of blood. People are bound to one another by the 
nature of the relationship itself. It is not a voluntary, nor an equal relationship (particularly where Safie 
is concerned, as will be seen). One does not consent to be born, nor do we have a say regarding to 
                                                 
17  Victor seems to put himself on the same footing as God in this regard: “A new species would bless me as its creator and 
source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of their 
children so completely as I should deserve theirs” (101-2). 
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whom we are related, or even into what conditions we are thrown. If the DeLaceys are capable of 
survival and moments of joy despite poverty, it is because they look after one another. Indeed, this 
picture of patriarchy presents the “patriarch” not as a breadwinner, but a dependent.18  
 Whereas Victor’s privilege causes him to take family for granted, only to really appreciate their 
importance as they die off, the Creature learns very quickly what he is missing: “where were my friends 
and relations? No father had watched my infant days, no mother had blessed me with smiles and 
caresses”(166-167). As he comes to understand more about the family, his admiration turns to envy and 
amplifies his loneliness: “The gentle words of Agatha and the charming smiles of the Arabian were not 
for me” (166). The more he knows about humanity the more he feels isolated. 
 The subplot of “the Arabian” is a bit of a riddle in the story. The story of Safie appears designed 
to provide a model of romantic love in addition to the familial love demonstrated by the cottagers. To 
note this, however, is to still leave open the question of why Safie must be a Muslim and speak another 
language. I suspect two reasons for this. The first is, in portraying Christianity as friendlier to women’s 
rights than Islam, Shelley means to imply that Christians ought to take pride in and develop that aspect 
of their culture. The second reason is that Safie demonstrates the possibility of dialogue across 
differences: the difference between a Frenchman and a Turk, the difference between a monster and a 
human, or the difference between a child and an adult. Safie, like the Creature, is learning about this 
culture for the first time, and is in that regard like a child. Yet, despite being dependent, Safie is also 
shown as a caregiver when “her attendant fell dangerously ill. Safie nursed her with the most devoted 
                                                 
18  It may be that Victor’s rejection of the Creature is rooted in a failure to understand the significance of contingency–that 
life must be dealt with on its terms, not ideal terms. He would control life by mastering death (99), and thinks that the 
ideal human is one created according to principles of utility. Assuming one has the right to consent to the type or quality 
of offspring one has, the attitude of a consumer in a marketplace, Victor feels justified in rejecting the Creature as faulty 
goods. 
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affection, but the poor girl died,” leaving the girl, like the Creature earlier, “alone, unacquainted with 
the language of the country and utterly ignorant of the customs of the world” (172). Yet, as both of them 
grow in knowledge, simultaneously hearing Volney’s Ruins from Felix, for instance “Safie was always 
gay and happy” (164), while he is a “Miserable, unhappy wretch!” (166) 
 Another, perhaps accidental, implication of the Safie-Felix relationship is that it is possible for 
genuine caring bonds to exist between unequals. Circumstances have made Safie prisoner to Felix–she 
is essentially a slave, sold by her father to preserve himself from poverty. This “bondage to which she 
was now reduced” (169) is an engagement not unlike many others of Shelley’s era. Yet, despite its 
questionable beginnings, the relationship blooms, resulting not only in happiness for the lovers, but 
“happiness among [the cottage’s] inhabitants” (176). A marriage is not just an arrangement between two 
individuals, but an integration of relationships. In this case, Safie being without nearby family is 
integrated entirely into the DeLaceys. There are many reasons to question the ethics of this situation and 
the traditional marriage it resembles. Rather than defending a particular family model, however, I feel 
that what Shelley is doing here is demonstrating the complex ways in which agency, consent, and 
fulfilment play out in light of the fact some people must depend on others. Her point is to show that a 
healthy ethical life is not only for the privileged—that even in conditions of poverty and injustice, there 
is a place for caring relationships. This also suggests that caring relations have to be established before 
an articulation of what is and is not just or fair can take place. The Creature’s lack of these relations is 
why he can mistake retribution for fairness. 
 Seeing the DeLaceys accept an outsider gives the Creature hope at the same time as it deepens 
his despair. Although Safie is far from her roots, she has a past–childhood is part of her four-
dimensional self. As for the Creature, “where were my friends and relations? No father had watched my 
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infant days, no mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses” (166-7) and “when I viewed the bliss 
of my protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me” (175). Yet, he “cherished hope” (176) that if he 
were to make himself known to this apparently very caring family, they might adopt him as one of their 
own. His attempt to ingratiate himself to the family fails spectacularly and their rejection becomes a 
formative moment in the Creature’s temperament. 
 Having already scared the first humans he encounters after being abandoned by the DeLaceys, 
the Creature reasons, “There was none among the myriads of men that existed who would pity or assist 
me; and should I feel kindness towards my enemies? No; from that moment I declared ever-lasting war 
against the species” (181). This shift is partly the fault of Felix, who refuses dialogue with the Creature, 
immediately adopting a confrontational stance. However, this reaction also echoes Milton’s dejected 
Satan and is itself rooted in an oppositional attitude. The simplest reading of the Creature’s intense 
emotional outburst, which involves setting the DeLacey cottage ablaze as soon as they quit their home 
(184), is that he is a child: his uncultivated emotions will be intense, and he will tend to act impulsively 
on them. The fortunate thing about normal children is that they are not nine feet tall and possessed of 
ogre strength. This is yet another difficult area for liberal law and ethics: how to approach the 
transgressions of those who do not fit the presumed rational agent model. Not only children, but adults 
of varying cognitive capacity, present exceptional (to liberalism’s alleged bias) cases for consent, 
responsibility, and culpability.19 
 Victor’s idea of culpability is simple: the Creature murdered and so should die. The Creature is 
                                                 
19  The distinction between responsibility and culpability is an important one for any comparison of care ethics and 
masculinist ethics. In the masculinist discourse, the two terms are often taken to be synonymous. By contrast, care ethics 
is concerned about the forward-looking sense of responsibility: not the past actions we are “responsible for,” but rather 
the friends and relations we are responsible for and responsible to. Because care ethics is firstly concerned with mending 
relationships, the assigning of blame is taken to be non-essential to the ethical project, possibly even counterproductive 
in certain cases. 
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guilty of murder because his hands slew the victims. Although he would come to feel guilt for his role 
in the chain of events, Victor never quite comes to fully understand his responsibility to correct the 
situation–his responsibility to “render [the Creature] happy before I complained of his wickedness” 
(147), although he flirts with it when he finally grants the Creature's request to “hear me” (146). The 
Creature, on the other hand, is sure of Victor’s responsibility: “you were my father, my creator; and to 
whom could I apply with more fitness than to him who had given me life?” (184) Victor is his only link 
to the “chain of existence and events from which I am now excluded” (193), but even he ultimately 
rejects the Creature. 
 Despite his oaths against humanity in moments of anger, the Creature’s compassion keeps 
reappearing and lasts through several rejections and murders: “Think you that the groans of Clerval 
were music to my ears? My heart was fashioned to be susceptible of love and sympathy” (262), before 
being fully extinguished with the death of Elizabeth: “Evil then became my good. Urged thus far, I had 
no choice but to adapt my nature to an element which I had willingly chosen” (262). Before this killing 
spree and decay of character, as he embarks on his quest to find Frankenstein, the Creature’s growing 
homicidal desire is reflected in the climate:  
Nature decayed around me, and the sun became heatless; rain and snow poured around me; 
mighty rivers were frozen; the surface of the earth was hard and chill, and bare, and I found no 
shelter. . . . The mildness of my nature had fled, and all within me was turned to gall and 
bitterness. (184-5) 
The season continues to reflect his temperament, spring coming just before the Creature commits an act 
of caring intervention: 
The day, which was one of the first of spring, cheered even me by the loveliness of its sunshine 
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and the balminess of the air. I felt emotions of gentleness and pleasure . . . a young girl came 
running towards the spot where I was concealed, laughing, as if she ran from someone in sport. 
She continued her course along the precipitous sides of the river, when suddenly her foot 
slipped, and she fell into the rapid stream. I rushed from my hiding-place and with extreme 
labour from the force of the current, saved her and dragged her to shore. (185-6) 
This ends discussion of environment within the Creature’s narrative, which from this point is 
dominated by descriptions of emotions. After saving the girl, her frightened guardian immediately 
assumes a confrontational posture, and ends up shooting the Creature. This refusal to hear out the 
Creature and consider the context drives the Creature into “a hellish rage and gnashing of teeth,” and to 
again declare “vengeance to all mankind” (186), yet it will be seen that there is still love in him. 
 The Creature’s initial intentions toward his first murder victim are benevolent, if aggressive. 
Noting that young William “was unprejudiced and had lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror 
of deformity” (187), the Creature approaches him as a potential friend. Yet again, he finds himself 
rejected (not that kidnapping was ever a good strategy), but still hopes to persuade the child to accept 
him (albeit by force): “I do not intend to hurt you; listen to me” (187). It is only upon mention of the 
name of Frankenstein that his rage is reawakened and the child becomes his murder victim. 
 This death the Creature triumphs in as an act of justice. Yet faced with an image of femininity, 
he yields for a moment. When he finds a portrait of Caroline on the body of William, “In spite of my 
malignity, it softened and attracted me” (187), but as soon as he speculates how one such as her would 
respond to one such as him, his isolation and bitterness return. This leads him to deviously frame 
Justine for the murder of William. 
 Justine herself seems introduced to show man’s justice system in action. This is suggested not 
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only by her name, but also by the fact that she is the only character to go through a full trial and 
sentencing. In its confrontational approach, the investigators have taken Justine’s physical symptoms to 
be signs of guilt, rather than consider the possibility that it could be grief. They take her confusion to be 
again a sign of guilt rather than a sign of innocence (126). It may seem commonsensical today with our 
better understanding of emotions that an innocent person would be flustered and confused in light of a 
false accusation, but under a more entrenched patriarchy, the masculinist distrust of emotion stereotypes 
the guilty as out of control and the upstanding citizen as a Stoic who does not fear because s/he has 
nothing to hide. 
 This refusal to engage in dialogue with Justine is only part of why she is misjudged. Her 
character is in fact well known by many, who collectively may have been able to save her if they had 
spoken in her defence. Instead, their failure of friendship leads to the failure of justice and the 
condemnation of Justine. Even Alphonse is taken in by the circumstantial evidence combined with a 
flawed understanding of emotions.20 At trial, the moral voice of the novel, Elizabeth, steps forward to 
both condemn this silence and to portray Justine as an exemplary care giver: 
[W]hen I see a fellow creature about to perish through the cowardice of her pretended friends, I 
wish to be allowed to speak, that I may say what I know of her character. . . . She nursed 
Madame Frankenstein, my aunt, in her last illness, with the greatest affection and care and 
afterwards attended her own mother during a tedious illness . . . She was warmly attached to the 
child who is now dead and acted towards him like a most affectionate mother. (131) 
This fails to move the jury, and Justine is unjustly executed. The “cowardice” responsible for this 
extends to Justine’s friends in general, but unbeknownst to Elizabeth, to Victor in particular. 
                                                 
20 Perhaps the same flaw that motivated him to take a confrontational stance against Victor’s early reading. 
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Victor witnesses the Creature “in the gloom” (123) immediately following the death of William. It takes 
no time for him to realise that this is the murderer. Following his feelings, his moral instincts, Victor 
rushes to see his father: “My first thought was to discover what I knew of the murderer and cause 
instant pursuit to be made. But I paused when I reflected on the story I had to tell.” Not only does Victor 
pause, he talks himself right out of action: “These reflections determined me and I resolved to remain 
silent” (124). Ignoring once again an emotional imperative, Victor rationalises inaction on the grounds 
that according to his hypothetical weighing of outcomes, he would not be believed and the Creature 
would escape anyway. 
 When Alphonse, the most caring male in the novel, writes to Victor about the death of William, 
he makes a point of warning Victor against confrontationalism: 
Come, Victor; not brooding thoughts against the assassin, but with feelings of peace and 
gentleness, that will heal, instead of festering, the wounds of our minds. Enter the house of 
mourning, my friend, but with kindness and affection for those who love you, and not with 
hatred for your enemies. (120) 
The family has been ruptured and the important matter is to heal it. The pursuit of justice-as-vengeance 
will not bring peace. Still, Victor's commitment to principle over compromise leaves him intransigent in 
the face of the Creature’s demands. 
 The initial confrontation between Victor and the Creature shows Victor arguing in the language 
of the ethics of justice, while the Creature’s perspective partakes of both justice and care. The 
confrontation also reveals contradictions within the liberal tradition that arise specifically because of its 
failure to account for children. According to the Lockean theory of property, the Creature is an object of 
Victor's labour, and so his to command. Yet, according to Milton's depiction of Adam, a creator owes 
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love and guidance in exchange for this obedience. The Lockean tradition assumes fully-formed self-
owning individuals from the outset, which is why it cannot account for the labour that goes into 
creating a person. Even as Victor develops an awareness of his culpability in the monster’s acts, he fails 
to recognise his responsibility for the Creature’s care. 
 Two languages continue through their confrontation: the language of justice and the language of 
care. Victor uses mostly the former, the Creature uses both. The Creature pleas for sympathy and 
appeals only to the duties he feels a creator should have toward its creation: “I will even be mild and 
docile to my natural lord and king if thou will also perform thy part, the which thou owest me” (145). 
This is feudal language, but also familial. Even more familial is the assertion that, by the very nature of 
their relationship, Victor cannot be free of the Creature and his claims on him: “Yet you, my creator, 
detest and spurn me, thy creature, to whom thou art bound by ties only dissoluble by the annihilation of 
one of us” (145). The basis for these duties is unarticulated. The “ties” implied seem stronger than those 
of Milton’s creator and created–Satan’s rebellion severs his ties with Heaven. The kind of duty the 
Creature has in mind, then, is more likely that he saw enacted among the DeLaceys. 
 Besides the nature of caring relations, the Creature also learns about the interrelational nature of 
the self from the DeLaceys, coming to know his first-studied humans by role as much as proper name: 
The youth and his companion had each of them several names, but the old man had only one, 
which was “father.” The girl was called “sister” or “Agatha,” and the youth “Felix,” “brother,” 
or “son.” I cannot describe the delight I felt when I learned the ideas appropriated to each of 
these sounds[.] (158) 
Having witnessed the social and interdependent nature of humans, the Creature’s plea for a mate is not 
simply to put an end to pangs of loneliness or open the possibility of a more pleasurable life; he needs 
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completion. Only in relation to another does a life make sense. In Paradise Lost, “Satan had his 
companions, fellow devils, to admire and encourage him,”and Adam was sent out of the garden with 
Eve, but “no Eve soothed my sorrows nor shared my thoughts” (176). Without a companion, and 
specifically without a feminine influence, the Creature is incomplete and lost.21 
 Some of the Creature’s argument, such as the passage, “be not equitable to every other and 
trample upon me alone, to whom thy justice, and even thy clemency and affection is most due” (145-6) 
challenges the disinterested position of utilitarian ethics and highlights the special moral claims that 
arise from the nature of one’s relationship with a particular other. The foregoing passage also 
differentiates “justice” from “affection” and implies that while the former may be due to humanity at 
large, the Creature has a special claim to something more. The distrust of utilitarianism is expressed 
even more harshly when the Creature exclaims, “You accuse me of murder, and yet you would, with a 
satisfied conscience, destroy your own creature. Oh, praise the eternal justice of man!” (146) For what 
he believes would be the greater good, Victor is prepared to sacrifice his only son. Again, the contrast 
between what “eternal justice” recommends (killing one to potentially save many, regardless of who the 
“one” is) and what a caring perspective recommends (meeting the needs of your dependents before they 
turn antisocial) is highlighted. In this light, the utilitarian perspective looks grotesque. 
 Victor, for his part, initially refuses dialogue: “I will not hear you. There can be no community 
between you and me; we are enemies” (146). He forms his words in a tone of judgement and threat of 
punishment: “Devil . . . do you dare approach me? And do you not fear the vengeance of my arm 
wreaked on your miserable head?” (145) He also implicitly endorses the justice-as-punishment ideal, 
                                                 
21  It is interesting that Shelley’s Creature leaves out reference to the passages unflattering to Eve. As far as he and the moral 
of the story are concerned, Eve and Adam, made of the same clay, complete one another. The liberal individual, 
resembling the defiant Satan, and an exclusively masculine perspective are both deformities. 
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and with “oh! That I could, with the extinction of your miserable existence restore those victims you 
have so diabolically murdered!” the justice-as-compensation ideal, both typical of masculinist thinking 
and institutions. The entreaty, “Have I not suffered enough, that you seek to increase my misery?” (145) 
is only met with more resistance. Convinced a killer is owed no sympathy, Victor will not quickly 
budge in his conviction. This is reflective of Kantian ethics which, because of its rationalistic method of 
formulating principles of right and wrong, does not admit of exceptions. 
 At first, the Creature’s need does not move Victor any more than appeals to his paternity, aside 
from his momentary sympathy when he deigns to listen to the Creature’s story (146). However, after the 
Creature has told his tale, in a moment that might be a missed opportunity to stem the tragedy, Victor is 
“moved” and “felt that there was some justice in his argument.” He is persuaded at this point that his 
relationship to the Creature does entail particular duties: “did I not as his maker owe him all the portion 
of happiness that it was in my power to bestow?” (191) Yet, this moment of compassion is short-lived, 
overwhelmed by considerations of utility: acceding to the Creature’s demands and creating a mate for 
him might double the destruction wrought: “you will then have a companion to aid you in the task of 
destruction” (192). The speculative needs of the many outweigh the demonstrated needs of the one 
child, and having reasoned his way to a conclusion, Victor will not let further considerations distract 
him from his resolve: 
The idea of renewing my labours did not for one instant occur to me; the threat I had heard 
weighed on my thoughts, but I did not reflect that a voluntary act of mine could avert it. I had 
resolved in my own mind that to create another like the fiend would be an act of the basest and 
most atrocious selfishness and I banished from my mind every thought that could lead to a 
different conclusion. (215) 
 
 
59 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Victor’s failure to consider the interrelational constitution of self leads him 
to misinterpret the Creature’s threat about his wedding night. It may be that this failure is why he cannot 
believe that the Creature would indeed become peaceful upon gaining a partner. He does not realise that 
the Creature’s deficiency in controlling his impulses and basic morality is due not only to a lack of 
upbringing, but also to a lack of kindred: “You must create a female for me with whom I can live in the 
interchange of those sympathies necessary for my being” (190). A social being like humans, the 
Creature needs the society of at least one other to temper his impulses and engage him in the dialogue 
that keeps the peace. 
 Eventually, Victor agrees to provide the Creature with a mate, but in the spirit of exchange, not 
care: “I consent to your demand, on your solemn oath to quit Europe forever, and every other place in 
the neighbourhood of man, as soon as I shall deliver into your hands a female who will accompany you 
in your exile” (193). This oath, however, reveals a tension between deontology and utilitarianism. 
According to Kant, who considers it of the nature of moral principles that they do not admit of 
exception, promise-breaking cannot be good under any circumstances. Yet, utilitarian reasoning leads 
Victor to renege on his promise: “I shuddered to think that future ages might curse me as their pest, 
whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price, perhaps, of the existence of the 
whole human race” (211). Again, his particular duties to his Creature, and the reasons the Creature 
needs this mate (whose potential feelings in the matter no one is bothering to consider) escape the 
imagination of Frankenstein. 
 The Creature finally drives the lesson home all too painfully. Understanding the interrelational 
nature of self, the Creature “destroyed thee [Victor] by destroying all thou lovedst” (261). Victor’s 
narration of the tale gives some signs that his experiences have increased his awareness of caring 
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values. Telling the story of creation, during the passage marking his blindness to the changing seasons, 
Victor reflects, “If the study to which you apply yourself has a tendency to weaken your affections and 
to destroy your taste for those simple pleasures in which no alloy can possibly mix, then that study is 
certainly unlawful” (103). This appears to be an insight into the role of emotions in determining value. 
Although his call for a “calm and peaceful mind” could suggest detachment, the distinction between 
“affections” (good) and “passions” (bad) implies that there are in fact better and worse ways to emote–
that, far from being impediments to decision-making, emotions are central to it. 
 A realisation about liberalism is made when discussing Elizabeth’s final letter: the good is not 
reducible to liberty. Speculating that he might one day be free of the Creature, Victor laments, “Alas! 
What freedom? Such as the peasant enjoys when his family have been massacred before his eyes, his 
cottage burnt, his lands laid waste, and he is turned adrift, homeless, penniless, alone, but free” (232). 
Finally, on his deathbed, Victor has come to realise the irreplaceability of particular relationships:  
when you speak of new ties and fresh affections, think you that any can replace those who are 
gone? Can any man be to me as Clerval was, or any woman another Elizabeth? Even where the 
affections are not strongly moved by any superior excellence, the companions of our childhood 
always possess a certain power over our minds which hardly any later friend can obtain. They 
know our infantine dispositions, which, however they may be afterwards modified, are never 
eradicated; and they can judge of our actions with more certain conclusions as to the integrity of 
our motives. (255) 
Not only has he realised the necessity of relationships as the antidote to loneliness, he sees how our 
relationships help to determine our moral character. The self-regulating individual is seen in this novel 
to be fickle. Reason itself is shown to be fickle, as Victor reasons his way into and out of the same 
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attitudes. The only constant is the constancy of friends and family, some (the women) more constant 
than others. 
 Throughout, Victor is both comforted and pleaded with by his family. I covered much of this in 
Chapter Two. Towards the end of the novel, Victor becomes more appreciative of what his family has 
been doing for him. When he leaves for England, Victor discovers that “Without previously 
communicating with me, he [Alphonse] had, in concert with Elizabeth, arranged that Clerval should 
join me in Strasbourg” (198). Because he has a secret, Victor seeks isolation, but his family knows well 
that no man is an island. Narrating this point, Victor also observes, “it was her [Elizabeth’s] care which 
provided me a companion in Clerval – and yet a man is blind to a thousand minute circumstances 
which call forth a woman’s sedulous attention” (199). In retrospect, he seems to understand that 
heeding a woman’s perspective might save one from tragedies such as the one he has created. 
 The character of Victor Frankenstein is prefigured by Robert Walton, a “romantic”(67) who 
would find the fabled Northwest passage. Like Victor, he justifies his project in the name of a greater 
good: “you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind to the last 
generation” (64). Also like Victor, he has left his family behind to pursue his goal. Both Frankenstein 
and Walton are connected to a woman by letters, the difference being that Walton writes to his sister, 
Margaret Seville (whose full initials are also those of the novel’s author), while Elizabeth writes to 
Victor. Elizabeth, aware of human interdependence, sends Clerval to keep Victor company. Walton, 
resembling in the following passage the Creature more than Frankenstein, is perfectly aware of his need 
for companionship: “I have no friend . . . there will be none to participate in my joy . . . no one will 
endeavour to sustain me in dejection” (67). Furthermore, he is aware of the sort of companion he needs, 
one “who could sympathise with me, whose eyes would reply to mine” (67), as well as the sort of care 
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he needs: “my daydreams . . . want (as painters call it) keeping; and I greatly need a friend who would 
have sense enough not to despise me as a romantic, and affection enough for me to endeavour to 
regulate my mind” (68). The sense and affection Walton seeks are the qualities of good caring: 
attentiveness and engrossment. He seeks the patience and understanding required to assist a juvenile 
mind along the way to maturity. Given that his letters are in part a defence of his journey to rest the 
concerns of his sister who would temper his ambitions, it is ironic that he pines for a “man” (67) to fill 
this role for him. 
 Not only is Walton, for all his self-consciousness, oblivious that what he seeks is someone to 
play a caring role (just as masculinist philosophy and history ignore the work of care givers), he also 
takes for granted the crew he has chartered to sail him. This persistence is the sort of headstrong 
ambition valued by masculinist ideology, especially when it is rooted in a quest for a greater good. It is 
only after facing unconquerable weather conditions and hearing Victor’s tale that he agrees to put their 
lives ahead of his dream. Even then, he fails to shift ethical paradigms, judging the turnaround as a 
defeat: “Thus are my hopes blasted by cowardice and indecision; I come back ignorant and 
disappointed. It requires more philosophy than I possess to bear this injustice with patience . . . I have 
lost my hopes of utility and glory” (258). The tragic mode of the novel might have hinted toward a 
happier future, but although Walton does the right thing, but it is unclear whether his reasons are 
defeatism or concern for his crew. His continuing references to “cowardice,” “injustice,” “utility,” and 
“glory,” leave room for speculation about his progress. 
 A further sign of Walton’s masculinism is his gushing praise of Frankenstein. “Noble and 
godlike” (253), Walton calls Victor in spite of his story, “glorious spirit” (260) upon his death. The 
passage, “He seems to feel his own worth and the greatness of his fall” demonstrates Walton’s 
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admiration for Frankenstein’s quest–after all, it was for the greater good, it just happened to go wrong. 
The consequences are deemed evils, but in Walton’s estimation, Victor is blameless for having followed 
a good principle in his initial endeavour. Although Walton has a change of mind about his voyage, he 
does not have a complete change of heart about masculinist ethics. 
 Walton comes to realise that glory means little if not shared, but still holds glory and “the 
greater good” as ideals. After sequestering himself for the sake of his research, only to have his research 
run amok beyond the lab, Frankenstein realises the necessity of kin and the folly of untempered 
masculine ambition, but dies wanting vengeance. The Creature understands throughout the novel the 
need for society, but without an upbringing, and without anyone willing to engage in dialogue, he has 
no fair means to seek fulfilment. When reasoning fails, and threats fail, the Creature destroys Victor by 
destroying his family. Frankenstein presents a contrast between masculinist ethics, including 
utilitarianism and deontology, as well as the ideal of the autonomous individual lauded by liberals. This 
is not a liberal feminist story which would hold that only conditions of true equality can enable ethical 
life. This is not a radical feminist story that would do away with the “traditional” family unit. Rather, 
this story is written from the perspective of care ethics, emphasising the importance of and 
responsibility that comes from particular relationships, and acknowledging the distinct moral insights 
afforded those who are care givers or who are without a care giver.
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CONCLUSION 
“My Dear Sister”: reading from the standpoint of M.S.W. 
 
 Like most of Shelley's other novels, such as Lodore (1835), Falkner (1837), and Mathilda 
(written 1819-20 but unpublished), Frankenstein focuses on issues of family and features as an 
essential plot detail the absence of a mother. As with Lodore, Falkner, and Valperga (1823), 
Frankenstein features female characters with values in conflict with men or with society. In Valperga 
and Frankenstein, the feminine voice goes unheeded by ambitious men, and tragedy ensues. In Falkner, 
the feminine influence triumphs (Ellis 159-61). This recurring interest in the absent mother and 
unheeded voice of daughters and lovers invites study of Shelley's ouvre for any scholar interested in 
literary articulations of the ethics of care. Frankenstein in particular, takes a very direct and 
philosophical approach to the ethics of masculinism, creating a monster's mind from classical, 
romantic, and liberal texts, then putting this monster in conflict with his father, his only parent. The 
contrasting values supplied by the DeLaceys and Frankensteins point to what Victor could have had if 
he had only followed the natural sentiments that he suppresses for the sake of effecting his grand vision. 
 It is oft remarked that Frankenstein is a cautionary tale against ambition, but the distinctly 
feminist tone of the caution is sometimes missed. Considered in light of the ethics of care, the message 
becomes clearer: ignoring the feminine voice will lead to moral decisions that do not work in the real 
world. A person exists as the nexus of a set of relationships. Taking that nexus as essential while 
considering the relations themselves contingent and extraneous to paradigmatic moral dilemmas will 
result in the annihilation of those relations and the destruction of oneself. 
 The Creature with only a man for a parent and only masculine authors for guides, but with an 
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appreciation for the value of  family that Victor only achieves too late, has a higher moral awareness 
than his father, but he is morally half-formed, willing to use his knowledge of the importance of family 
to destroy Victor by destroying his. As much as he is Victor's parallel in many regards, in this he is 
Victor's opposite: whereas Victor sequesters himself in his study, taking books and a lab to be all he 
needs, negligent of his family, the Creature needs nothing more than companionship, and attaining that 
would be willing to abandon all else. 
 The framing narrative of a series of letters addressed to Walton's sister, who shares Shelley's 
initials, indicates that this novel presents a woman's perspective on the behaviour of men, while also 
reminding the reader that woman's own voice remains suppressed. Besides providing this key to 
approaching the novel, the framing narrative provides an opportunity to end the tragedy with a glimmer 
of hope for the cycle of masculinist ethics to be broken, and for universal principles and grand visions, 
“the eternal justice of man” to start giving way a little to the demands of particular relationships and 
basic needs. 
 The ethics of care provides a lens for reading Frankenstein that makes sense of the whole. 
Ambition and scientism certainly come under scrutiny, but the novel is dominated by discussions of 
family, references to marriage, and calls for the recognition of paternal duties. The loss of Victor's 
mother is indicative of this lack of maternal influence, and the letters from Elizabeth are the feminine 
voice that he has banished from his conscience. The placement of Margaret Walton Seville in the 
reader's seat indicates that we as readers are supposed to consider this tale from her perspective—that 
of caring family.
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